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FROM THE INCEPTION TO THE AFTERMATH
OF INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW v.
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.: ACHIEVING ITS
POTENTIAL TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
As women entered the work force in increasing numbers during the
twentieth century, employers instituted policies limiting their participa-
tion in certain work-related activities on the basis of gender or reproduc-
tive capacity.' Frequently, employers rationalized such policies by
espousing the stereotype that women, as the weaker and more delicate
sex, required special rules and guidance.2
1. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding an Iowa statute
proscribing the number of hours women were permitted to work). For a citation list of
nineteen other state statutes that imposed mandatory working hours for women, see i. at
419 n.1; see also Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53
U. Cm. L. REv. 1219 (1986) (examining the development of fetal protection policies from
Muller to modem case law).
2. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 421. The Muller Court graphically depicted society's view
of women in 1908:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is espe-
cially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are
not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time
on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon
the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical
well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to
preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
Id. The Muller Court added: "Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always
been dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset by superior physical
strength, and this control... has continued to the present." Id. This view continued well
into the 20th century, as recognized by the findings of a congressional committee in 1978:
"Women are still subject to the stereotype that all women are marginal workers. Until a
woman passes the child-bearing age, she is viewed by employers as potentially pregnant."
H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1978). The Petitioners in International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991), cited these stereotypes in
support of their argument to the Supreme Court, stating: "[Tihere is at least a substantial
risk that employers instituting fetal protection policies are expressing, albeit unthinkingly,
the stereotypical assumption that women are marginal workers whose economic impor-
tance and need for employment is necessarily subordinate to their childbearing role."
Brief for Petitioner at 24, Johnson Controls (No. 89-1215). Cf. Los Angeles Dep't of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 (1978) (invalidating under Title VII an employer's
policy of requiring women to contribute more than men to retirement plans based on the
assumption that women generally outlive men). The Manhart Court noted: "It is now well
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Congress sought to eliminate discriminatory employment practices by
enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which contains prohibi-
tions against gender discrimination in the workplace.3 Section 703(e)(1)'s
narrow exception, however, permits gender-based, facially discriminatory
policies in those rare instances where the requirement qualifies as a
"bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise."4 Consequently, some
employers continued to institute overt, gender-based policies by asserting
that the restrictions imposed on women could be validated under the lim-
ited "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) exception.5
recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impres-
sions about the characteristics of males or females. Myths and purely habitual assumptions
about a woman's inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable rea-
sons for refusing to employ qualified individuals ..... " Id. at 707 (footnote omitted).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(a) (1988). Section 703(a) of
the Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
4. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1). The provision states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for
an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual.., on
the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise,....
Id. Note that race is excluded from the BFOQ exception; therefore, a policy explicitly
discriminating against an individual on the basis of race will be invalidated automatically.
See Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of the De-
fense to Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 Omo ST. LU. 5, 5-7 (1991) (discussing the basic
components of the BFOQ defense and its minimal legislative history).
5. See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980)
(upholding under the BFOQ exception, a company policy requiring pregnant flight attend-
ants to take mandatory leaves of absences on the ground that their pregnancy would im-
pair their mobility, affecting their job performance); Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558
F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (sustaining a facially discriminatory company policy that required
pregnant flight attendants to take mandatory leaves of absence on the ground that endur-
ance and strength are BFOQs for the job), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978). See also
Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (uphold-
ing womanhood as a BFOQ for correctional officer positions in an exclusively women
prison), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1082 (1989).
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Facially discriminatory or disparate treatment policies directly violate
Title VII's prohibitions against gender discrimination because the meas-
ures themselves contain language explicitly discriminating on the basis of
gender.6 Such employer regulations will be invalidated unless the em-
ployer successfully raises the BFOQ defense.7 In contrast, disparate im-
pact policies contain no explicit reference to gender in the policies' actual
language, thus they do not expressly target a protected group for differ-
ential treatment.' However, as applied, such policies disproportionately
burden women.' Facially neutral policies may be upheld if the employer
successfully raises the business necessity defense. 10
In 1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) as
an amendment to Title VII, in order to accord women greater protection
from so-called "neutral policies" that do not discriminate on the basis of
gender per se, but rather discriminate on the basis of pregnancy." The
6. See, e.g., Harriss, 649 F.2d at 676-77.
7. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for examples of this defense.
8. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) (sustaining an em-
ployer policy that excluded fertile women from certain jobs by determining that the em-
ployer successfully raised the business necessity defense). For discussions of the differ-
ences between the two tests, see Pendleton E. Hamlet, Note, Fetal Protection Policies: A
Statutory Proposal in the Wake of International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 75
CORNELL L. REv. 1110, 1112-14 (1990) (examining the two theories and providing
examples).
9. See, e.g., Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Community Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867 F.2d 974,
978-79 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that the employer justified a neutral maternity leave policy
under business necessity defense).
10. See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (sustaining
as a business necessity an employer's policy requiring that flight attendants take a
mandatory leave of absence between the thirteenth and twenty-eighth weeks of pregnancy
on the grounds that overriding passenger safety concerns justified the discrimination and
no reasonable alternative existed), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); see STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101ST CONrG., 2D SEss., A REPORT ON THE EEOC,
TITLE VII AND WORKPiLACE FETAL PROTECrION POLICIES IN THE 1980s, 13 (Comm. Print
1990) [hereinafter EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT]. The House Report describes dispa-
rate impact policies as:
neutral employment practices which have discriminatory effects, without having
to prove discriminatory intent .... A minimum height requirement is an example
of such a policy, because it would screen out more female than male applicants.
Under this theory, an employment practice violates Title VII if it has a significant
"disparate impact" on women, unless the employer establishes that the policy is
justified by business necessity.
1d; see also Befort, supra note 4, at 8 (containing a succinct summary of disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact theories).
11. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)). The provision states, in part:
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
1993]
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PDA mandates that policies which deprive women of employment oppor-
tunities on the basis of pregnancy or "related medical conditions" are
equivalent to explicit gender discrimination and, therefore, directly vio-
late Title VII's proscriptions against gender discrimination.12 Despite
these clear legislative pronouncements, prior to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., a no clear
consensus existed among the circuits as to whether gender-based, fetal
protection policies consistently required disparate treatment/BFOQ anal-
ysis or disparate impact/business necessity analysis.14
ditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, ... as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
Id.
12. See id.; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684
(1983) (striking down as unlawful under the PDA, a company policy that excluded male
employee's spouses from receiving pregnancy benefits by equating discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy with overt gender discrimination).
13. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
14. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1554 (11th Cir. 1984)
(sustaining under the business necessity defense an employer policy requiring pregnant x-
ray technicians to take mandatory leaves of absences); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172
(4th Cir. 1982) (utilizing the disparate impact framework to uphold, under the business
necessity defense, an employer policy barring fertile women from certain positions);
Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 369 (4th Cir. 1980) (classifying an em-
ployer's mandatory leave policy as facially neutral; however, "[t]he trial court, recog-
nize[ed] [that] some confusion in itle VII sex discrimination cases [exists] as to whether a
BFOQ defense or a business necessity defense applies to a disparate impact type discrimi-
nation" (footnotes omitted)), cert denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). Cf. Grant v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303, 1310-12 (6th Cir. 1990) (classifying a policy excluding women
from lead exposure jobs as a facially discriminatory policy that does not establish a
BFOQ); Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Serv., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988)
(sustaining as a BFOQ a facially discriminatory policy requiring prison guards to be female
at an all-women correctional facility), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, and cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1082 (1989); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1981)
(characterizing a pregnancy leave policy as facially discriminatory but holding that it could
be sustained under the BFOQ exception); Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 1176
(4th Cir. 1977) (upholding a facially discriminatory company practice of requiring pregnant
flight attendants to take mandatory leave of absence on the ground that physical endur-
ance is a BFOQ for the occupation), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,235 (5th Cir. 1969) (determining that a facially discrimi-
natory employer policy of barring women from "switchmen" positions can not survive
BFOQ analysis); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1969)
(invalidating a facially discriminatory policy that deemed women employees ineligible for
positions that would require them to lift objects exceeding 35 pounds but permitting the
employer to substitute the policy with a neutral measure that required all employees to
show that they could satisfy the employer's lifting requirements on the ground that the
ability to lift heavy objects constituted a BFOQ for the job); Gudbrandson v. Genuine
Parts Co., 297 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Minn. 1968) (invalidating a facially discriminatory policy
of excluding women from warehouseman jobs on the ground that being male did not qual-
ify as a BFOQ).
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Johnson Controls arose out of an employee class action brought in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin against
a battery manufacturing company.15 The class challenged under Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by the PDA, the company's
fetal protection policy that expressly excluded all fertile women, regard-
less of whether they were pregnant or ever intended to have children,
16
from positions in which they could be exposed to lead levels in excess of
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) regula-
tions.
17
15. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 310
(E.D. Wis. 1988), affd en banc, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
The class consisted of persons including: Mary Craig, a Johnson Controls worker who
elected to undergo sterilization to prevent the company from terminating her employment;
Elsie Nason, a 50-year old employee who suffered a salary reduction when the company
effectuated her mandatory transfer to another division where she would not be exposed to
lead; and Donald Penney, an employee in the lead industry, whose request for a voluntary
leave of absence in order to reduce his blood lead level before attempting to father a child
was denied. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1200
(1991).
16. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200. Johnson Controls's 1982 fetal protection pol-
icy stated in relevant part: "'[flt is [Johnson Controls's] policy that women who are preg-
nant or who are capable of bearing children will not be placed into jobs involving lead
exposure or which could expose them to lead through the exercise of job bidding, bumping,
transfer or promotion rights."' Id. (quoting Johnson Controls's fetal protection policy (al-
teration in original)). Prior to the 1982 policy, the company adhered to a fetal protection
policy established in 1977 that substantially differed from the one at issue before the
Supreme Court. Id. at 1199. Under the former policy, the company did not place any
restrictions on fertile women whatsoever, the measure merely advised fertile women not to
accept employment in the lead industry. Id. The 1977 policy stated in relevant part:
"Protection of the health of the unborn child is the immediate and direct respon-
sibility of the prospective parents. While the medical profession and the company
can support them in the exercise of this responsibility, it cannot assume it for
them without simultaneously infringing on their rights as persons.
"Since not all women who can become mothers wish to become mothers
(or will become mothers), it would appear to be illegal discrimination to treat all
who are capable of pregnancy as though they will become pregnant."
Id. (quoting Johnson Controls's "first official" fetal protection policy (alterations in
original)).
17. Id. at 1199-1200. OSHA set the "permissible [lead] exposure limit" as no "greater
than fifty micrograms per cubic meter of air.., averaged over an 8-hour period." 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1025(c)(1) (1992). The lead standard requires that if "any employee is ex-
posed to lead above the permissible exposure limit for more than 30 days per year, the
employer shall implement engineering and work practice controls." Id. § 1910.1025(e)(1).
The standard established the "[a]ction level" at "30 micrograms of lead per cubic meter of
air." Id. § 1910.1025(b). When an employee's lead exposure level reaches the "action
level," he or she must undergo "initial [medical] monitoring" of his or her lead exposure
level. Id. § 1910.1025(c)(4). OSHA did not promulgate a separate "permissible exposure
limit" for men and women who desire to conceive children. See id. However, in 1978,
OSHA recommended that
Catholic University Law Review
Adopting the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' approach of classifying fe-
tal protection policies as facially neutral and analyzing them under the
disparate impact theory, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment ruling in
favor of Johnson Controls."8 The court held that the company could sus-
the blood level of workers, both men and women, who wish to plan pregnancies
should be maintained at less than 30 ... [micrograms per cubic grams of air]
during this period, and this knowledge forms the basis for the action level of 30
... [micrograms per cubic grams of air] established in this final standard which
the agency believes will maintain the majority of blood levels below 30... [micro-
grams per cubic grams of air].
Occupational Exposure to Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 52952, 52963 (1978). OSHA emphasized
that adverse effects to the reproductive system from lead exposure can occur in both men
and women. Id. at 52960. Moreover, OSHA specifically maintained that its final lead
standard must not be construed as mandating that women be excluded from the lead indus-
try. Id. at 52966. The following passage summarizes OSHA's positions that lead exposure
has deleterious effects on both sexes and that women should not be prohibited from ac-
cepting lead-exposure occupations.
The record in this rulemaking is clear that male workers may be adversely ef-
fected [sic] by lead as well as women. Male workers may be rendered infertile or
impotent, and both men and women are subject to genetic damage which may
affect both the course and outcome of pregnancy. Given the data in this record,
OSHA believes there is no basis whatsoever for the claim that women of childbear-
ing age should be excluded from the workplace in order to protect the fetus or the
course of pregnancy. Effective compliance with all aspects of these standards will
minimize risk to all persons and should therefore insure equal employment for
both men and women. There is no evidentiary basis, nor is there anything in this
final standard, which would form the basis for not hiring workers of either sex in
the lead industry.
Id. (emphasis added).
Johnson Controls claimed to have complied with all precautionary measures established
by OSHA to alleviate lead exposure in both male and female workers. See Johnson Con-
trols, 680 F. Supp. at 314. However, despite the foregoing pronouncements against unilat-
erally excluding women from the lead industry, the company responded to OSHA's
recommendation by instituting its broad fetal protection policy in 1982. See Johnson Con-
trols, 111 S. Ct. at 1200. Under the Johnson Controls policy, the company banned all wo-
men from jobs exposing them to lead in instances where the results of a single female
employee's blood test revealed a lead reading in excess of 30 micrograms per deciliter,
unless a physician attested to a female employee's infertility. See Pet. for Cert. at 5, John-
son Controls (No. 89-1215). The potential dangers to the fetus from exposure to lead in-
clude: impairment to the central nervous system, behavioral difficulties and learning
disabilities. Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. at 314 (citing expert testimony). Studies indi-
cate that lead in a pregnant woman's blood stream can be conveyed to the fetus through
the placenta. Id. However, it is imperative to note that "[ol the eight pregnancies re-
ported among the female employees, it has not been shown that any of the babies have
birth defects or other abnormalities." Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1208.
18. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 901 (7th Cir.
1989) (en bane), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). The Seventh Circuit stated that Johnson
Controls required the Court to ascertain:
the proper legal analysis to be applied to Johnson's fetal protection program
under Title VII. The question presented is should we follow the lead of the
[Vol. 43:227
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tain the policy under the modified business necessity defense created by
the Fourth Circuit.' 9 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the
policy could also be validated under the BFOQ exception because the
"industrial safety" concern with lead exposure justified the discriminatory
policy.2" The Seventh Circuit decision became the only fetal protection
Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit and the EEOC in determining that these
policies can be justified with a "business necessity" defense or must we conclude
that these policies may only be justified with a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion defense.
Id. at 883. This Comment focuses on the revision of analytical paradigms for scrutinizing
fetal protection policies. Therefore, the issue of potential employer tort liability resulting
from fetal injury is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally infra note 307 (rais-
ing the issue of tort liability and citing articles that provide further discussion of the issue).
19. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 893, 901. In justifying its decision to apply disparate
impact analysis principles and allow the policy to be justified by the company under the
business necessity defense the court proclaimed: "We are convinced that the components
of the business necessity defense the courts of appeals and the EEOC have utilized in fetal
protection cases balance the interests of the employer, the employee and the unborn child
in a manner consistent with Title VII." Id. at 886. Applying the three-prong business
necessity defense to Johnson Controls's policy, the Seventh Circuit readily articulated that
no dispute as to any material fact existed with respect to the first and third elements of the
business necessity defense. The court found that uncontroverted testimony revealed that a
"substantial risk" of fetal harm existed and held that the plaintiffs waived their right to
prove that other viable alternatives existed by failing to raise that issue on appeal. Id. at
888-91. With respect to the second prong, that the harm must be transmitted only through
one sex, the court discussed at length whether Johnson Controls showed the absence of a
factual dispute regarding whether the harm could only be transmitted through women. Id.
at 889. Resolving the issue in favor of Johnson Controls, the court classified as speculative
animal studies indicating that a male's reproductive system is adversely affected by lead
exposure, and ultimately concluded that the company established that fetal injury could
only be transmitted through women. Id. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d
1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (permitting the use of animal studies as evidence revealing the dele-
terious effects of lead on males), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); see also Marcelo L.
Riffaud, Comment, Fetal Protection and UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Job Openings for
Barred Women Only, 58 FoRDnAm L. REv. 843 (1990) (examining the Johnson Controls
opinion issued by the Seventh Circuit). See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text for
discussion of the three prong business necessity test.
20. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 893-94, 901. However, dissenting Judges Posner,
Easterbrook and Cudahy disputed the majority's conclusion that the Johnson Controls pol-
icy could survive BFOQ analysis. See id. at 901-21 (Cudahy, Posner & Easterbrook, J.J.,
dissenting). In Judge Posner's separate dissenting opinion, he asserted that the majority
erred in characterizing the company's measure as facially neutral. Id. at 901 (Posner, J.,
dissenting). Judge Easterbrook, in his separate dissent, stated that "Johnson's policy is sex
discrimination, forbidden unless sex is a 'bona fide occupational qualification-which it is
not." Id. at 908 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). In espousing this view, Judge Easterbrook
stated:
Johnson defends its fetal protection policy on the basis of concern for the wel-
fare of the next generation, an objective unrelated to its ability to make batteries
... [while the BFOQ test] speaks of the 'operation of the business' or to any
woman's 'ability or inability to work' (the standard of the PDA).
Id. at 912.
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case that explicitly upheld, under both the business necessity and BFOQ
analysis, policies that excluded women from certain positions.21
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit's decision, in large part by refusing to treat the policy
as facially neutral.' The Court recharacterized the fetal protection pol-
icy as facially discriminatory because it explicitly singled out women for
special treatment despite the existence of studies revealing the harmful
effects of lead exposure on males. 3 Applying disparate treatment analy-
sis, the Court reasoned that the female sterility requirement did not es-
tablish a BFOQ because the measure was not "reasonably necessary to
the normal operation" of battery manufacturing.' Moreover, the John-
son Controls Court relied on the PDA, which deems discrimination
against potentially pregnant women equal to gender discrimination, and
pointed out that the PDA establishes "a BFOQ standard of its own"-
that women capable of childbearing must be treated the same as others
with respect to their occupational abilities.'
Given that fertile and infertile women are equally capable of efficient
battery production, the Court concluded that the fetal protection policy
must fail under this analysis.z6 By unequivocally mandating the applica-
tion of disparate treatment/BFOQ analysis, Johnson Controls resolved
the conflict formerly existing among the circuits regarding which analytic
framework warranted application to employer fetal protection policies.27
Furthermore, the decision puts teeth into the PDA by effectuating its
mandate of modifying the definition of gender discrimination to include
discrimination against pregnant or potentially pregnant women.28
This Comment first examines judicial decisions leading up to the
Supreme Court's decision in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc. by focusing on the two tests employed in gender discrimination
cases arising under Title VII: disparate impact and disparate treatment.
This Comment then discusses the significant cases that interpret and de-
fine the BFOQ exception under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended by the PDA. Next, this Comment analyzes Johnson
21. Id. at 901.
22. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1202. Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by
Justices Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter.
23. Id. ("The bias on Johnson Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile
women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a
particular job.").
24. Id. at 1204, 1207 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1) (1988)).
25. Id. at 1206.
26. Id. at 1207.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1206.
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Controls and reasons that the Court's determination that fetal protection
policies must be analyzed only under the rigorous disparate treatment
principles represents an accurate interpretation of Title VII and affords
women augmented employment rights. Finally, this Comment explores
the impact of Johnson Controls by focusing on a case currently working
its way through the legal system, International Union, UAW v. Exide
Corp. Examining Johnson Controls's far-reaching impact of ensuring
that women employees receive fair and equal treatment, this Comment
culminates with a prediction of Exide's outcome based on the Johnson
Controls rationale.
I. TBE Two FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYZING POLICIES CHALLENGED
AS VIOLATIVE OF TITLE VII: DISPARATE IMPACr vs.
DISPARATE TREATMENT ANALYSIS
A. Disparate Impact Analysis and the Judicially Created Business
Necessity Defense
The hallmark of the business necessity defense is that an employer can
justify a facially neutral policy, resulting in a disparate impact on a pro-
tected class, where he or she establishes "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question."29 The Supreme Court developed this test in a
series of cases commencing with Griggs v. Duke Power Co.3 0 Almost ten
years later, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits built on the principles ar-
ticulated in Griggs by developing a modified business necessity defense to
be applied exclusively to fetal protection policies.
31
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Evolution of the Business
Necessity Defense
In Griggs, the Supreme Court first confronted the challenge of recon-
ciling the Title VII provisions with a facially neutral company promotion
policy that, as applied, disproportionately burdened a protected class.32
In that case, a group of African-American employees challenged their
employer's policy deeming only workers who passed intelligence tests or
29. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
31. See infra notes 75-83, 89-91 and accompanying text.
32. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428. "Business necessity as a defense was first defined by the
Supreme Court concomitantly with the recognition of disparate impact discrimination."
Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, 633 F.2d 361, 369-70 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965
(1981); see Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation
of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under 77tle VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641,
671 (1981) (discussing Griggs with respect to the development of the business necessity
defense).
1993]
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possessed high school diplomas eligible for certain jobs and promotions.3
The Court characterized the policy as facially neutral because the require-
ments contained no overt language excluding the protected class from
employment opportunities; therefore, the policy did not directly violate
Section 703(a) of Title VII, as it existed in 1971.31 However, as applied,
the measure disproportionately burdened African-Americans because
very few of them met the testing or high school diploma requirements
that would have qualified them for job transfers.35
The Court refused to uphold the exclusionary policy even though it
technically complied with Title VII.36 The Griggs Court looked beyond
the statutory language and scrutinized Title VII's legislative history for an
alternative test to apply to a measure that lacked expressly exclusionary
terms.37 The majority concluded that the congressional intent for enact-
ing Title VII was to ensure racial equality and to eradicate the "artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment" that protected
groups encountered.3 1 The Court reasoned that sustaining the em-
ployer's policy that did not facially violate Title VII but which, as applied,
served to perpetuate past discriminatory employment practices, would
clearly frustrate the congressional motivation for enacting Title VII.39
For this reason, the Court devised the separate analytical paradigm for
analyzing neutral policies that would become the crux of disparate impact
analysis.4" Under this analysis, a prima facie case of disparate impact can
33. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 went into effect on
July 2, 1965, "the Company openly discriminated" against African-American employees by
allowing them to work only in the labor department, thereby excluding them on the basis
of race from the four other departments where whites exclusively held the positions. Id. at
426-27. After July 2, 1965, the company replaced its facially discriminatory policy with the
neutral policy, requiring certain aptitude test scores and a high school diploma as prerequi-
sites for hiring and transfer. Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1988), permits employers to use "any professionally developed ability test... [that] is
not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race." Id.
34. Id. at 431; see infra note 57 (describing the 1991 Amendment to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 codifying disparate impact principles).
35. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (quoting the appellate court's opinion noting that "whites
register far better on the Company's alternative requirements" than blacks).
36. See iii at 436.
37. Id. at 429-31.
38. Id. at 431. The Court explained that "[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at
430.
39. Id. at 431-32. "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII .... [WIas
to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees." Id. at
429-30.
40. See id. at 429-31.
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only be maintained if the Title VII plaintiff establishes the existence of
neutral employment measures and that the policy disproportionately bur-
dens a protected class.4" The plaintiff need not prove that the employer
engaged in intentional discrimination.42 After the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden of persuasion shifts to
the defendant-employer to raise the business necessity defense by dem-
onstrating that the measure legitimately bears a "manifest relationship to
the employment in question."
43
Applying this test, the Court invalidated the Duke Power policy on the
ground that the company failed to meet its burden of showing a reason-
able relationship between the educational requirements and job perform-
ance.44 To the contrary, the evidence revealed that the unskilled,
predominantly African-American workers could perform their occupa-
tional tasks as well as the workers who passed the tests or possessed high
school diplomas.45 By holding that the employer could not justify the
disparate impact policy under the business necessity test, the Supreme
Court made the monumental pronouncement that it would not condone
policies that accomplished the impermissible goal of employment dis-
crimination in their application.46
41. See id.
42. Id. at 432.
43. Id. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touch-stone is business necessity." Id. at
431.
44. Id. at 431, 436. "On the record before us, neither the high school completion re-
quirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to
successful performance of the jobs for which it was used." Id. at 431. Accentuating the
absence of a relationship between occupational achievement and the requirements, the
Court stated that "employees who have not completed high school or taken the tests have
continued to perform satisfactorily." Id.; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977 (1988) (extending disparate impact analysis to judging whether subjective hiring
criteria, as opposed to objective tests, amount to impermissible discrimination).
45. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 436.
46. See Id. at 436. The Supreme Court recognized the business necessity defense set
forth in Griggs in subsequent decisions. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47
(1982) (following Griggs by requiring the employer to show that neutral policy bears "'a
manifest relationship to the employment in question"' (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432));
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-77 (1978) (affirming the Seventh Cir-
cuit's ruling invalidating a facially neutral hiring policy on the ground that the employer's
purported safety concern did not qualify as a business necessity).
Griggs and its progeny have established a three-part analysis of disparate-im-
pact claims. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must
show that the facially neutral employment practice had a significantly discrimina-
tory impact. If that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate that
'any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion,' in order to avoid a finding of discrimination. Even in such a case, however,
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2. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: Relaxing the Requirements
for Establishing Business Necessity and the Burdens of Proof
from the Employer's Perspective
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,a7 employees challenged their
employer's facially neutral hiring practice as causing a disproportionate
number of non-whites to occupy unskilled cannery positions. 48 The
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment for the employees
on the ground that a statistical discrepancy alone, indicating a racial divi-
sion in occupational positions, will not suffice to establish a prima facie
case of employment discrimination.4 9 Rather, the Court emphasized that
the plaintiff must demonstrate that each discrete employment practice
caused the stratification.5
Furthermore, the Court relaxed the business necessity defense itself,
thus lessening the requirements for the defendant-employer to establish
business necessity."1 Deviating from the Griggs "manifest relationship"
test,5 2 the Supreme Court held that the employment practice need not be
"'indispensable"' to the particular occupation to qualify as a business ne-
cessity. 3 In making this pronouncement, the majority explained that an
the plaintiff may prevail, if he shows that the employer was using the practice as a
mere pretext for discrimination.
Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432) (alteration in original).
47. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
48. Id. at 647-48. The affected employees argued "that a variety of petitioners' hiring/
promotion practices-e.g., nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria,
separate hiring channels, a practice of not promoting from within-were responsible for
the racial stratification." Id.
49. Id. at 653. The Court deemed significant the fact that the company hired mostly
nonwhite employees for unskilled because it contracted with a predominately non-white
union. Id. at 654. The Court stated that "[r]acial imbalance in one segment of an em-
ployer's work force does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact." Id. at 653; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that "statistical disparities in the employer's work
force" are not enough to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; rather, the plaintiff
must show that the employer's specific practices themselves achieved the disparity).
50. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658. The majority acknowledged that "[s]ome will
complain that this specific causation requirement is unduly burdensome on Title VII plain-
tiffs." Id. at 657; see Meredith L. Jason, Note, International Union v. Johnson Controls,
Inc.: Controlling Women's Equal Employment Opportunities Through Fetal Protection Poli-
cies, 40 Am. U. L. REv. 453, 462-63 (1990) (detailing the impact of Wards Cove on dispa-
rate impact analysis).
51. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658.
52. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (emphasis added).
53. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (describing the scope of the business necessity defense
by noting that "there is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indis-
pensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster: this degree of scrutiny would be
almost impossible for most employers to meet"); see Befort, supra note 4, at 11; Jason,
supra note 50, at 462.
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employer may establish business necessity by simply revealing a relation-
ship between any job requirement and the policy so long as the "chal-
lenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment
goals of the employer." 4
The Wards Cove Court further simplified the business necessity defense
from the employer's perspective by reallocating the burdens of proof es-
tablished in Griggs.55 The Court dictated that once the plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden of production, not
persuasion, shifts to the defendant-employer to provide any "business
justification" for the policy. 56 In contrast to Griggs, however, the Wards
Cove Court reassigned the burdens of proof by holding that the burden of
persuasion will remain consistently with the Title VII plaintiff to demon-
strate that the employer's articulated business reason did not qualify as a
business necessity.57 The essential holding of Griggs survived in Wards
Cove: that an employer may only succeed in the business necessity de-
fense if he or she can establish a relationship between the policy and the
54. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
55. Id.
56. In delineating the revised burden shifting framework, the majority clarified that
after the plaintiff set forth a prima facie case of disparate impact, "the employer carries the
burden of producing evidence of a business justification for his employment practice." Id.
57. Id. at 660. The Court emphasized that the "burden of persuasion... remains with
the disparate-impact plaintiff." Id. at 659. The majority further explained that "the plain-
tiff bears the burden of disproving an employer's assertion that the adverse employment
action or practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral consideration." Id. at 660.
However, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress revised the Wards Cove burdens of
proof required to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (Supp. 1I 1991). Rather than adapting the Wards Cove burden of proof framework in
which the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion, Congress codified the standard set forth
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1977), by reassigning the burden of per-
suasion to the defendant-employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (k)(1)(A)(i). Congress mandated
that the employer "demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity" after the Title VII plaintiff sustains his
or her burden of establishing that the employer policy has a disparate impact on a pro-
tected class. Id. The definitional section of the statute specifies that "[t]he term 'demon-
strates' means meets the burdens of production and persuasion." Id. § 2000e(m). The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 not only reinstated the Griggs burden-shifting paradigm, but it
also codified the more stringent Griggs business necessity defense. Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (stating that the purpose of the Act was "to codify the concepts of
'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 410 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)"). In enacting the 1991 legislation, Con-
gress recognized that "the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil
rights protections." Id. § 2, 105 Stat. at 1071; see also Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991:
The Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARV. L. Rnv. 896,903-06,910-13 (1993) (describing
the impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on the holding in Wards Cove).
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occupation. However, the Wards Cove Court markedly eased the re-
quirements for the employer to succeed in the business necessity defense.
3. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' Modified Business Necessity
Defense for Analyzing Fetal Protection Policies
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits developed a modified business ne-
cessity defense to be applied exclusively to fetal protection policies."
The revised test significantly differed from the traditional business neces-
sity defense because it did not require the employer to establish any rea-
sonable relationship between the policy and the occupation.5 9 The ra-
tionale for eliminating this fundamental requirement was that occupa-
tional policies designed to ensure fetal health do not relate to actual job
performance; rather, employers generally institute these policies to pro-
tect their employees' potential offspring.6 0 Therefore, under established
business necessity principles, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for an
employer to find a connection between the health of children and the
female employee's ability to fulfill her occupational duties.61
Wright v. Olin Corp.62 initially required the Fourth Circuit to deter-
mine which legal theory to apply when analyzing an employer-imposed
fetal protection policy. 3 The majority prefaced its opinion by emphasiz-
58. See Recent Case, 103 HARv. L. Rnv. 977 (1990) (critiquing the modified business
necessity standard specific to fetal protection policies as applied in the Seventh Circuit
Johnson Controls decision); infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing the busi-
ness necessity defense specific to fetal protection policies).
59. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984). Although
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 appeared to overrule Wards Cove entirely, the legislation
upheld a crucial aspect of that decision regarding the causation issue. The Act specified
that the Title VII plaintiff, in effectuating his or her prima facie case, must establish that
each discrete employment practice caused the discriminatory impact on a protected class.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). However, the Act exempts plaintiffs who demonstrate
that the employer practices cannot be evaluated on an individual basis from the require-
ment that each distinct employment measure must be proven to cause a discriminatory
effect. Id.
60. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552.
61. See id.
62. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
63. Id. at 1184. The majority recognized
at the outset that the problem of fitting the fetal vulnerability program into the
appropriate theory of claim and defense as developed in Title VII litigation is one
of first impression with this court and-we are advised-with any court of appeals
... [A]s is well established, it is often appropriate to assess particular Title VII
claims and defenses alternatively under different theories.
Id. The plaintiffs argued that BFOQ analysis was appropriate in the wake of the PDA,
which equates discrimination on the basis of reproductive potential with gender discrimi-
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ing that neither of these analytic frameworks should not be applied rig-
idly."4 Wright arose out of a Title VII class action challenge to a policy
excluding women from working in areas containing airborne lead.65 The
employer instituted the policy to protect its employees' potential off-
spring.66 After acknowledging the difficulty in characterizing the com-
pany policy,67 the majority reasoned that fetal protection policies more
closely resemble neutral than facially discriminatory policies because em-
ployers draft such measures "in gender neutral terms" to protect all chil-
dren from potential lead damage." Thus, only as applied do such
measures have the "obvious and indisputabl[e] ... consequence" of ex-
cluding women from certain positions.69 However, the majority recog-
nation, thus warranting disparate treatment analysis. See Diane S. Peake, Note, Employ-
ment Discrimination-Wright v. Olin Corp.: 7te VII and the Exclusion of Women from the
Fetally Toxic Workplace, 62 N.C. L. Rnv. 1068 (1984) (providing a detailed examination of
Wright).
64. See Wright, 697 F.2d at 1184. "The Court has continually admonished ... that
these theories were not expected nor intended to operate with rigid precision with respect
to the infinite variety of factual patterns that would emerge in Title VII litigation." Id.
(footnotes omitted). The Wright Court pointed out that "while the loose equation-overt
discriminationionly b.f.o.q. defense-is therefore properly descriptive of a paradigmatic
litigation pattern, it is not an accurate statement of any inherent constraints in Title VII
doctrine." Id. at 1185 n.21.
65. Id. at 1182. The February, 1978 policy stated in relevant part:
1)Restricted jobs are those which "may require contact with and exposure to
known or suspected abortifacient or teratogenic agents." Fertile women are ex-
cluded from such jobs. Any woman age 5 through 63 is assumed to be fertile and
can be placed in a restricted job only after consulting with Olin's medical doctors
to confirm the woman cannot bear children and will sustain no other adverse
physiological effects from the environment.
Id
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1184. The court "conced[ed] that the fact situation.., does not fit with
absolute precision into any of the developed theories." Id.
68. Id. at 1186. Explaining the inapplicability of disparate treatment principles to the
instant matter, the opinion stated:
[t]he claim is that the intention to "treat less favorably" is manifest in the very
nature of the program and the factual defense is not truly aimed at rebutting this
indisputable fact but at justifying it on the basis that the purpose behind it was
benign in relation to the claimants' sex. To force such a claim and defense into
that special proof scheme would torture its logical foundations.
Id. at 1185 n.20.
69. Id. at 1186. Applying pre-PDA principles, the court did not consider the effect of
the PDA on fetal protection policies, which equates discrimination on the basis of repro-
ductive potential with gender discrimination. It appears that the Fourth Circuit was still
relying on the pre-PDA framework, under which courts viewed employer policies exclud-
ing women based on fertility as neutral policies, requiring analysis under disparate impact
principles. Cf. Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying
post-PDA analysis to characterize an employer's fetal protection policy, designed to pro-
tect female employees' potential offspring from lead exposure, as facially discriminatory).
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nized that the "'facial neutrality' of Olin's fetal vulnerability program
might be subject to logical dispute, 70 because the policy obviously re-
stricted only women despite its purportedly "neutral" terms.71 Nonethe-
less, the court characterized the fetal protection policy as neutral, having
a disparate impact on women, rather than as overt discrimination.72 The
majority further justified the application of business necessity principles
to fetal protection policies by asserting that the same safety concerns that
have validated employer policies designed to protect invitees and licen-
sees exist in fetal protection policies that seek to preserve the health and
safety of employees' offspring.73
Adhering to basic disparate impact principles while recognizing the dif-
ficulty in applying the traditional business necessity defense to this novel
fact situation,74 the Fourth Circuit developed a three-prong business ne-
cessity defense to be applied exclusively to fetal protection policies.75
Under the Wright test, the employer must first show that a "significant"
risk of harm exists to the unborn fetus76 and, second, that the hazard is
transmitted only through a single sex.77 If the employer establishes these
elements, a prima facie case of business necessity exists.78 However, the
third prong allows the plaintiff to rebut the presumption of business ne-
cessity by showing the existence of alternative policies that would equally
minimize the risk of fetal harm while alleviating the disparate impact on
women.79 If the Title VII plaintiff successfully sustains her burden, the
policy will fail for lack of business necessity.80 Conversely, if he or she
does not, the employer policy will be sustained under the modified
For discussion of the pre- and post-PDA analytic frameworks, see infra notes 147-81 and
accompanying text.
70. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1186; see Befort, supra note 4, at 31-32.
71. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1186.
72. Id. at 1185.
73. Id. at 1189. The Wright court concluded that "the safety of unborn children of
workers would seem no less a matter of legitimate business concern than the safety of the
traditional business licensee or invitee upon an employer's premises." Id.
74. Id. at 1184-85.
75. Id. at 1190-91.
76. Id. at 1190.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1191-92.
79. Id. The court described in broad terms the standard that the plaintiff must meet to
rebut the presumption of business necessity, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that
"there are 'acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the
business purpose... [of protecting against the risk of harm], or accomplish it equally well
with a lesser differential ... impact [between women and men workers]."' hM at 1191
(quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971) (examining an
employer's seniority hiring practice that disproportionately burdened African-American
employees under the traditional business necessity defense) (alteration in original)).
80. See id. at 1189-91.
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business necessity defense."1 The court stressed that an employer must
present factual evidence to meet his or her burdens under the test;8
"subjective" evidence suggesting an employer's benevolent motivations
will not suffice to satisfy this modified business necessity defense.83 After
devising this revised defense, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district
court's judgment for the defendant so that the case could be retried under
the innovative test.84
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's reading of fetal protection policies
as neutral, the Eleventh Circuit took a different approach in Hayes v.
Shelby Memorial Hospital.'5 In Hayes, the court initially characterized
the hospital's fetal protection policy, mandating the firing of pregnant x-
ray technicians, as creating a presumption of facial discrimination be-
cause the measure plainly targeted women only. 6 However, the majority
reasoned that the employer could rebut the presumption of facial dis-
crimination if he or she could establish the policy's neutrality by showing
that "it effectively and equally protect[ed] the offspring of all employ-
ees."'  The Eleventh Circuit further explained that, even if the employer
could prove the termination policy's neutrality under that standard, as
applied, the policy impaired women only.8 Thus, the court concluded
that the policy could not be sustained unless the employer could satisfy
the Wright business necessity test. 9 In applying the Fourth Circuit's
three-prong test, however, the court held that the employer-hospital
failed to meet the first and third prongs. The defendant neither estab-
lished that the plaintiff would be subjected to an unreasonable risk of
radiation,9" nor did the employer show the absence of less discriminatory
alternatives.91 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rul-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1190.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1187.
85. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
86. Id. at 1548. The hospital implemented the policy out of concern over the deleteri-
ous effects that radiation exposure could have on pregnant employees' children, as well out
of fear of tort liability. See id.
87. Id. Cf. Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (characteriz-
ing a hospital policy that required pregnant x-ray technicians to resign as facially neutral at
the onset).
88. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548.
89. Id.; see supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing the three-prong busi-
ness necessity defense for fetal protection policies developed by the Fourth Circuit).
90. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1550-51.
91. I. at 1551.
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ing that an employer's firing of an employee upon the discovery of her
pregnancy violated Title VII as amended by the PDA. 92
Building on the doubts expressed by the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit recognized the difficulty in applying the traditional business ne-
cessity test to fetal protection policies because the key requirement for
business necessity is to establish a connection between the policy and job
performance.93 However, fetal protection polices do not relate directly to
job performance;94 a pregnant woman's exposure to radiation makes her
no less capable of performing her job as an x-ray technician.9" Thus, the
Hayes court asserted that the modified business necessity defense for fe-
tal protection policies broadened the scope of the defense by allowing the
employer to raise it-despite the absence of a correlation between the
policy and job performance-if the employer's motivation for the policy
arose from his or her concern for the health of the female employee's
potential offspring. 96
B. Disparate Treatment Analysis and the Application of the Statutory
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception
If the explicit language of an employer's policy discriminates against a
class protected under Title VII, courts generally characterize the policy as
facially discriminatory and in direct contravention of Section 703(a) of
Title VII's statutory prohibitions.' However, in very narrow circum-
stances, a court will legalize a policy with clearly discriminatory language
92. Id. at 1554.
93. Id. at 1552.
94. Id.; see Williams, supra note 32, at 689 (discussing the difficulty in employing the
business necessity defense to fetal protection policies due to the lack of "'job-related-
ness"'). "The 'job-relatedness' test for business necessity, although appropriate when test-
ing and employment qualifications are at issue, cannot easily be employed in situations
involving fetal health hazards. In such situations, the business purpose of the exclusionary
rule, to preserve fetal health, is unrelated to job performance." Id.
95. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (holding that a
policy denying job applications to women with pre-school children will only be sustained if
it qualifies as a BFOQ); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969) (holding that a company policy excluding women from "switchmen" positions did
not establish a BFOQ because women's job performance was not impaired by their inabil-
ity to lift certain heavy objects); Gudbrandson v. Genuine Parts Co., 297 F. Supp. 134 (D.
Minn. 1968) (holding that an employer's policy permitting only men to serve as warehouse-
men did not qualify as a BFOQ because women employees could perform the occupational
tasks as well as men). For a general discussion of the history of the BFOQ defense, see
United States Commission on Civil Rights, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the




if the employer successfully raises the Section 703(e) bona fide occupa-
tional qualification defense.98 The statutory BFOQ defense permits an
employer to implement an overtly discriminatory policy only "in those
certain instances where.., sex... is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness. ' 99 This standard requires the relationship between the challenged
policy and the employment practice to be "reasonably necessary," 100 not
merely reasonably related, as permitted under the business necessity
defense.
The general principle that challenged facially discriminatory policies
will be sustained only if the employer successfully raises the BFOQ ex-
ception, and that challenged facially neutral policies may be justified
under the business necessity defense, is not a mutually exclusive, rigidly
applied rule.101 As evinced by Hayes, some courts have permitted em-
ployers to raise the business necessity defense despite the fact that the
Eleventh Circuit determined that fetal protection policies created a pre-
sumption of facial discrimination.1°2 Conversely, in other matters, em-
ployers have successfully justified facially neutral policies under the
BFOQ standard. 0 3 The Supreme Court defined the BFOQ exception in
a series of cases during the 1970s and 1980s.0 4 Subsequently, the Fourth
98. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1977) (upholding an ex-
pressly exclusionary prison policy that forbade women from occupying prison guard posi-
tions on the ground that masculinity qualified as a BFOQ).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1546-47 (11th Cir. 1984)
(characterizing a termination policy for pregnant women as facially discriminatory, but ul-
timately applying the modified business necessity defense, a test normally applied to neu-
tral policies only); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1184 (4th Cir. 1982) ("The Court
has continually admonished, and indeed demonstrated in its own decisions, that these theo-
ries were not expected nor intended to operate with rigid precision with respect to the
infinite variety of factual patterns that would emerge in Title VII litigation." (footnotes
omitted)); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 364 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying
pre-PDA principles to characterize facially discriminatory mandatory leave policy for preg-
nant women as facially neutral), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); see also Williams, supra
note 32, at 670 ("Lower federal court decisions demonstrate serious confusion about the
... frameworks. There are a number of cases in which courts confound or commingle the
theories of disparate treatment and disparate effects and their respective defenses.").
102. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548.
103. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (allowing an
employer to substitute his facially discriminatory policy with a neutral policy requiring all
employees to be able to lift over 35 pounds as a prerequisite for securing a job because the
employer established that lifting was a BFOQ for job performance).
104. See infra notes 106-36 and accompanying text.
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and Ninth Circuits followed the Supreme Court's lead by utilizing this
statutory defense to scrutinize challenged gender-based policies. 105
1. The Supreme Court's Initial Examination of the BFOQ Defense
In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,l°6 the Supreme Court initially ar-
ticulated the general rule that a gender-based, facially discriminatory pol-
icy violates Title VII, unless the employer can establish a BFOQ. 1° In
Phillips, a corporation instituted a policy of rejecting job applications
from all women with pre-school age children on the ground that their
competing family obligations would adversely affect their job perform-
ance.' 08 Refusing to affirm the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit's summary judgment motion in favor of the employer, the
Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit incorrectly validated the school
leave policy because no evidence substantiated the employer's contention
that women with young children were less capable than men of fulfilling
their job obligations. 10 9 Absent evidence of real differences between the
occupational capabilities of men and women with young children, the
Court prohibited the employer from sustaining a male-only pre-school
teacher policy under the BFOQ exception."1
0
In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall paved the way for later
Supreme Court decisions by establishing parameters for the manner in
which the BFOQ would be interpreted."' Citing regulations of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the government
agency charged with enforcing Title VII," 2 Justice Marshall argued that
the BFOQ exception must be construed narrowly." 3 He pointed out that
105. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
106. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
107. See id. at 544.
108. Id. at 543.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 544. The Court remanded the matter to provide the employer an oppor-
tunity to sustain its burden of establishing a BFOQ by furnishing group data to establish
that women with young children were less capable than men to perform the job. Id. How-
ever, a year later, in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
709 (1978), the Supreme Court prohibited an employer from relying on group data show-
ing that women generally live longer than men in order to justify a policy of requiring them
to contribute more to their pensions than male employees. See infra notes 130-36 (analyz-
ing Manhart).
111. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544-47 (Marshall, J., concurring); see infra notes 113-14 and
accompanying text.
112. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 545 (stating that the EEOC regulations should be given
"'great deference."' (quoting Udal v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965))).
113. Id. The EEOC regulations cited by Justice Marshall provide, in pertinent part:
(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification ex-
ception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Labels-"Men's jobs" and
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the EEOC regulations indicate that facially discriminatory policies will
only be justified under the BFOQ exception in rare instances in which a
particular position "require[s] specific physical characteristics necessarily
possessed by only one sex."' 14 Relying on this standard, Justice Marshall
concluded that an employer's act of stereotyping women as having com-
peting family responsibilities could never qualify as a narrow circum-
stance whereby a woman's physical traits rendered her unable to perform
her job.
115
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,"16 the Court appeared to adopt and refine
Justice Marshall's analysis of the BFOQ defense set forth in his Phillips
concurrence. 117 In that case, the Court validated a facially discriminatory
policy instituted by the Alabama Department of Safety that explicitly for-
bade female correctional officers from holding "contact positions.""
8
"Women's jobs"-tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one
sex or the other.
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception:
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of
the sexes.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1972), quoted in Phillips, 400 U.S. at 546 n.3; see also Torres v. Wiscon-
sin Dept. of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532-33 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Rare is the
employment situation in which an employer could argue that gender-based distinctions are
a 'reasonably necessary' approach. .. ."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, and cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1082 (1989); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,232 (5th Cir. 1969)
("The legislative history indicates that this exception was intended to be narrowly con-
strued."); Employment Discrimination, supra note 97, at 1176 (discussing the legislative
history of the BFOQ, indicating that it was intended to be narrowly interpreted).
114. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 546 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall criticized the
majority for ignoring congressional intent and instead "fall[ing] into the trap of assuming
that the Act permits ancient canards about the proper role of women to be a basis for
discrimination." Id. at 545.
115. Id. Moreover, Justice Marshall emphasized that Congress's primary motivation
for promulgating Title VII prohibitions against gender discrimination was to establish that
polices based on stereotypical notions of women's traditional roles would not be tolerated.
Id.; see also Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235-36 (holding that barring women from "switchmen"
positions does not qualify as a BFOQ on the ground that factual bases, not stereotypical
assumptions, must exist are required to uphold the policy under the BFOQ exception).
116.. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
117. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544-46 (Marshall, J., concurring).
118. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 324-25, 336-37. The Alabama state prison policy first man-
dated that both men and women correctional officers meet the facially neutral requirement
of being at least five feet, two inches and weighing 120 pounds or more. Id. at 323-24. The
Dothard Court permitted the State to raise the business necessity defense in an effort to
sustain the neutral policy that, as applied, excluded women from correctional officer posi-
tions. See id. at 331. However, the Court held that the height and weight policy did not
qualify as a business necessity because the employer failed to demonstrate that such stan-
dards were "essential to effective job performance as a correctional counselor." Id. at 331.
A second policy, entitled Regulation 204, excluded women from "'contact positions,"' (i.e.
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Before determining the policy's lawfulness, the Court defined the scope
of the BFOQ defense.1 9 The majority stressed that the BFOQ defense
must succeed in only the narrowest circumstances where the very "es-
sence" of the particular business operation would be impaired if one sex
were not exclusively employed. 20 More specifically, the majority stated
that the defense would be recognized only if the vast majority of women
"'would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved."121 Drawing on previous decisions, the Court further empha-
sized that employer measures designed to perpetuate gender based ste-
reotypes would not be tolerated under the statutory exception. 122
Evaluating the exclusionary policy at issue under these standards, the
Court reasoned that women correctional counselors occupying "'contact'
position[s]" would confront an immediate threat of severe harm because
their job would require them to interact regularly with convicted male sex
offenders."2 After evaluating the evidence, the majority determined that
this risk was neither unfounded, nor rooted in stereotypical assump-
positions requiring the officer to have "'contact with the inmates of the opposite sex with-
out the presence of others"' and "'requir[ing] patrolling [sic] dormitories, restrooms, or
showers while in use"'). Id. at 325 n.6 (quoting Administrative Regulation 204).
119. See id. at 333.
120. Id. (citing Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)
(requiring flight attendants to be female failed to qualify as BFOQ on the ground that the
qualification does not go to the "essence" of their job), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)).
"We are persuaded ... that the bfoq exception was in fact meant to be an extremely
narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at
334 (footnotes omitted); see also Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (an
employer policy requiring flight engineers to retire at age 60 does not qualify as a BFOQ
given that age is not a core occupational requirement); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267,
1271 (4th Cir. 1977) (placing the burden on the employer in an age discrimination case "to
show ... that the bfoq which it invokes is reasonably necessary to the essence of its busi-
ness." (citing Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976))). It is not
enough that the qualification meets the looser "job-relatedness" and "manifest relation"
test sufficient to establish business necessity. Rather, for a requirement to qualify a
BFOQ, the inference can not be peripheral; it must be a central, core requirement of the
position. Cf. supra note 53 and accompanying text (indicating that the business necessity
defense, as set forth in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989), super-
seded by statute as stated in Joyner v. Monier Roof Tile, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Fla.
1992), did not require that the qualification be essential to the occupation).
121. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)); see Alison E. Grossman, Note, Striking Down Fetal Protection
Policies: A Feminist Victory? 77 VA. L. Rnv. 1607, 1612-14 (1991) (examining Dothard in
the context of discussing "'false' stereotypes" that serve to perpetuate the notion that only
one sex is capable of performing a certain occupation, and "'true' stereotypes" that include
real physical differences between the sexes which may affect job abilities).
122. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333; see also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S 542,
545 (1977); see infra note 129; supra notes 1, 115 and accompanying text.
123. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335.
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tions. 12 Recognizing that Congress established Title VII's proscriptions
against gender discrimination partly to enable women to make their own
decisions regarding the risks they would accept in the workplace, 125 the
Court stated that a restriction on free choice would be justified only in
limited circumstances that present imminent hazards to women employ-
ees. 1 26 Moreover, the majority explained ensuring that women correc-
tional officers' ability to perform their core task of ensuring order and
safety would be undermined by their gender.127 In this narrow circum-
stance, the majority declared, where both the woman's safety and her
ability to carry out her job would be severely jeopardized, the male-only
state policy could be justified under the BFOQ defense.
128
Under the BFOQ exception, the Supreme Court has refused to uphold
gender-based company policies that treat women as a homogeneous
group rather than as individuals with distinctive characteristics.'29 The
Court articulated this rule in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power
Co. v. Manhart.3 ° In that case, the Court scrutinized the Los Angeles
Water & Power Company's policy of requiring women to make larger
payments into their employee pension funds than their male co-work-
124. See id
125. See id
Title VII rejects ... romantic paternalism... and instead vests individual women
with the power to decide whether or not to take on unromantic tasks. Men have
always had the right to determine whether the incremental increase in remunera-
tion for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks is worth the
candle. The promise of Title VII is that women are now to be on equal footing.
Weeks, 408 F.2d at 236.
126. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335.
127. Id. at 336. The Court justified the policy under the BFOQ exception by conclud-
ing that "[t]he employee's very womanhood would.., directly undermine her capacity to
provide the security that is the essence of a correctional counselor's responsibility." Id.
128. Id.; see Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532
(7th Cir. 1988) (adopting Dothard by sustaining as BFOQ requirement that males exclu-
sively hold prison guard positions), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, and cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1082 (1989); see also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding as
constitutional a California statutory rape law that applied only to men on the ground that
real sex differences between men and women justified only males receiving a penalty).
129. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power Co. v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).
The Court noted that "[i]t is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be
predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the characteristics of males or fe-
males." Id. (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)). The Supreme Court explained that "[p]ractices that classify
employees in terms of... sex tend to preserve traditional assumptions about groups rather
than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals." Id. at 709.
130. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
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ers. 131 The company attempted to justify the policy on the ground that
women generally live longer than men and that therefore, the higher con-
tribution requirement was proper because women as a whole would ben-
efit from the plan longer than men.' 32 The majority rejected this
argument because the policy neglected to consider the individual differ-
ences that exist among women.' 33 Specifically, the Court determined that
the company policy impermissibly treated women as one group that lives
longer than men, while neglecting to consider that, despite the aggregate
data, not every woman within the group will outlive her male counter-
part.13
4
Furthermore, the Court noted that the employer failed to satisfy the
BFOQ test because no evidence indicated that the facially discriminatory
pension plan was "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of the
company's business retirement plan.135 Characterizing the provision as
unfairly overinclusive by requiring women who would not outlive males
to make higher contributions, the Court struck down the policy under
Section 703(a) of Title VII.13 6 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's logic in analyzing gender discriminatory
policies.
2. The Fourth and Ninth Circuit Approaches to the BFOQ Defense
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have followed the Supreme Court's pre-
cedent of construing the BFOQ defense narrowly. In Condit v. United
Air Lines, Inc.,"' the Fourth Circuit sustained United Air Lines' practice
of requiring flight attendants to take mandatory leaves of absence upon
discovering their pregnancy. 38 In upholding the facially discriminatory
policy as a BFOQ, the court emphasized that the policy could be sus-
tained under the narrow exception to Title VII because pregnancy inter-
131. Id. at 704; see also Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & De-
ferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (holding that a policy deferring
payments to women constitutes gender discrimination prohibited under Title VII).
132. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705. The employer concluded that in general, the 2,000 wo-
men employees will outlive the 10,000 men by a "few years." ld.
133. Id. at 707-08.
134. Id. at 707-08, 710. "Women, as a class, do live longer than men.... It is equally
true, however, that all individuals in the respective classes do not share the characteristic
that differentiates the average class representatives." Id. at 707-08. "Individual risks, like
individual performance, may not be predicated by resort to classifications proscribed by
Title VII." Id. at 710.
135. Id. at 716 n.30.
136. Id. at 722-23.
137. 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978).
138. Id. at 1176-77.
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fered with a flight attendant's fulfillment of her primary responsibility-
ensuring passenger safety.
139
In Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,14° the Ninth Circuit,
applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Dothard, recapitulated the
narrow circumstances in which an industrial safety concern establishes a
BFOQ.141 The Harriss court explained that a safety concern will only
qualify as a BFOQ where the core requirement of the particular job
is to ensure safety of others.142 The Ninth Circuit stressed that a gen-
eralized safety concern would not suffice.'43 Applying this limited
safety definition to the facts in Harriss, the court upheld another man-
datory leave policy for pregnant flight attendants under the BFOQ
exception on the ground that a pregnant flight attendant's reduced
mobility would interfere with her ability to fulfill her essential duty of
promoting passenger safety.' Thus, the majority concluded that
the pregnancy leave policy, though facially discriminatory, was
"reasonably necessary" to the safe operation of aircraft. 45 Therefore,
139. Id. The court stated that "pregnancy could incapacitate a stewardess in ways that
might threaten the safe operation of aircraft." Id at 1176. Cf. Burwell v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 367-69 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). The
Burwell court invalidated another mandatory leave policy that required flight attendants to
suspend their work prior to their 28th week of pregnancy because the court determined
that before that critical period, "a flight attendant undergoing a normal pregnancy can
perform both normal and emergency duties as well as a non-pregnant flight attendant." Id
at 367.
140. 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
141. Id. at 676-77.
142. See id.; see also Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236-38 (5th Cir.
1976) (justifying as a BFOQ, age limitations for bus drivers on the ground that the "es-
sence" of the job of safely transporting passengers is threatened when the company em-
ploys older drivers). Cf TMans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122-23 (1985)
(holding that the airline's practice of barring people age 60 or above from flight engineer
positions failed to qualify as BFOQ because the employer did not establish that persons in
that age group posed a safety threat or could not perform the job).
143. See Harriss, 649 F.2d at 677.
144. Id Using post-PDA principles, the court classified the policy as facially discrimi-
natory. See id at 676; infra notes 147-81 and accompanying text for discussion of pre- and
post-PDA approaches.
145. Harriss, 649 F.2d at 677. The Ninth Circuit justified its decision to uphold the
policy under the BFOQ exception by explaining that "'[t]he greater the safety factor, mea-
sured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of that harm in case of an acci-
dent, the more stringent may be the job qualifications."' Id. 676 (quoting Usery, 531 F.2d
at 236). Cf. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984) (utiliz-
ing the modified business necessity defense in applying disparate impact principles to a
hospital policy that excluded pregnant women from serving as x-ray technicians); Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1186-90 (4th Cir. 1982) (characterizing a company policy re-
stricting fertile women from holding positions where they would be exposed to lead as
facially neutral and creating a modified business necessity defense for analyzing such
policies).
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the court held that the employer successfully raised the narrow BFOQ
defense.
146
II. THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT (PDA): EQUATING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FERTILE WOMEN WITH
UNLAwFUL GENDER DISCRIMINATION
A. The PDA's Impact on Title VII and the Rationale Behind
Its Enactment
In 1978, Congress enacted the PDA as an amendment to Title VII's
employment discrimination provisions. 47 The PDA mandates that poli-
cies that do not discriminate directly "on the basis of sex" alone, but that
treat women less favorably based on their pregnancy or childbearing ca-
pacity, must be deemed facial discrimination on the basis of gender.'4
Therefore, such policies directly violate Title VII's prohibitions against
gender discrimination and will only be sustained if the employer can suc-
cessfully raise the BFOQ defense.149 Moreover, the second clause of the
PDA prohibits employers from treating women adversely on the basis of
their pregnancy or fertility by dictating that they must be treated the
"same for all employment-related purposes" as all other workers.150
Congress included this latter provision to ensure that any restrictions
placed on women based on their pregnancy or childbearing capacity
would only be valid in narrow instances where their ability to perform
their occupational tasks became impaired as a result of their condition.'
Congress enacted the PDA in response to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 52 where the Court held that dis-
146. Harriss, 649 F.2d at 677.
147. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).
148. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 2, at 1 ("The purpose of H.R. 6075 [the PDA] is to
amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by adding to section 701 a new subsection
(k) which clarifies that the prohibitions against gender discrimination in the act include
discrimination in employment based on pregnancy, child birth or related medical condi-
tions."); S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1978); see Jason, supra note 50, at 464-66
(discussing the PDA).
149. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
676-79 (1983) (interpreting the PDA as making discrimination against pregnant women
equivalent to overt, sex-based discrimination, directly prohibited under Title VII unless a
BFOQ exists).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988); see supra note 11 (quoting statutory language).
151. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 148, at 4 ("Pregnant women who are able to work
must be permitted to work on the same conditions as other employees; and when they are
not able to work for medical reasons, they must be accorded the same rights, leave privi-
leges and other benefits, as other workers who are disabled from working.").
152. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in Iselboro Sch. Comm. v.
Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
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crimination on the basis of pregnancy did not constitute explicit gender
discrimination.1 5 3 General Electric arose out of a class action challenge to
a company's comprehensive disability insurance policy that explicitly ex-
cluded pregnancy disability benefits, while extending coverage to nearly
every type of illness that could befall men."54 By holding that the exclu-
sion of pregnancy benefits did not amount to express gender discrimina-
tion, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's ruling that the
policy violated Title VII.'5 5 The Court reached this conclusion by refus-
ing to equate discrimination based on pregnancy with Title VII gender
discrimination. 56 The majority pronounced that General Electric's plan
did not impermissibly discriminate against women directly, but rather
that the insurance policy simply failed to provide coverage for "one phys-
ical condition-pregnancy."'
157
B. The Circuit Court Split Over Whether Disparate Treatment or
Disparate Impact Analysis Is Proper in Matters Implicating
the PDA
In spite of the PDA's clear statutory language that equating discrimina-
tion against the potentially pregnant with facial discrimination, circuit
courts have interpreted the Act differently. Notwithstanding the PDA,
some circuits continued to evaluate policies based on pregnancy or
childbearing capacity under the pre-PDA framework by characterizing
them as neutral disparate impact policies that may be sustained if the
employer successfully raises the business necessity test. 58 In contrast,
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits followed the PDA's declaration by inter-
preting it as mandating that any restrictions related to pregnancy or
153. Id. at 136.
154. Id. at 127-29.
155. Id. at 128. The Fourth Circuit did not find the Supreme Court's decision in
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), superseded by statute as stated in Newport News,
462 U.S. at 669, to be binding precedent on the instant matter. General Electric, 429 U.S.
at 132-33. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Geduldig Court upheld a disability
program also denying pregnancy benefits. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497. Because the Court in
Geduldig did not justify the policy under Title VII, the circuit court did not construe that
case as controlling precedent for General Electric. General Electric, 429 U.S. at 132-33.
156. See General Electric, 429 U.S. at 133. The Supreme Court believed Geduldig to be
controlling. Id. In General Electric, the Court relied on its finding in Geduldig that a
disability program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, to hold that a similar pro-
gram could not be invalidated under Title VII. Id.
157. Id. at 134 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20).
158. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright
v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d
361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
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childbearing are covered under Title VII's gender discrimination defini-
tion, directly contravening § 703(a) unless a BFOQ exists.159
The Seventh Circuit appeared to follow the pre-PDA framework in
Scherr v. Woodland School Community Consolidated District No. 50.60
In Scherr, two teachers challenged the school's pregnancy leave plan,
prohibiting them from taking specified amounts of maternity leave, as
unlawful under Title VII as amended by the PDA.' 6' The Seventh Cir-
cuit read the leave policy as neutral, warranting disparate impact analysis,
rather than construing the policy as facial discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy as mandated by the PDA. 62 By failing to treat discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy in the same manner as explicit gender discrimi-
nation, the court appeared to overlook the PDA's intent. 63 Finding
merit with the plaintiffs' argument while continuing to treat the measure
as neutral, the court reversed the order of summary judgment granted to
the defendant-school district and remanded the matter to enable the
plaintiffs to present evidence regarding the policy's disparate impact.'
64
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC,65 interpreted the PDA as equating discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy with discrimination on the basis of gender.'
66
Newport News involved a challenge to a company policy that provided
female employees with pregnancy disability benefits while denying such
159. See, e.g., Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (6th Cir. 1990)
(invalidating an employer policy that excluded fertile women from lead exposure jobs by
treating discrimination on the basis of childbearing capacity the same as overt gender dis-
crimination); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 451
(4th Cir.) (finding that an employer policy of denying insurance coverage to the insured
spouses of its male employees amounted to facial discrimination under the PDA), affd per
curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
160. 867 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1988).
161. Id. at 975-76. Plaintiff Maganuco intended to use her accumulated paid sick leave
during the time she would be disabled as a result of her pregnancy, followed by an unpaid
leave of absence for the rest of that school year. Id. However, under the policy, she could
not take paid, accumulated leave consecutively with an uncompensated leave of absence.
Id. Plaintiff Scherr desired to take paid sick leave while disabled due to her pregnancy;
however, the specifics of her school's policy required her to take an unpaid maternity
leave. Id.
162. Id. at 981.
163. Id. at 978-79. The Seventh Circuit elaborated that "the defendants err[ed] by
neglecting the context of the PDA and treating it as an independent statutory enactment.
It is not. The PDA is an amendment to a highly developed statutory scheme added in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert." Id. at 978
(citation omitted).
164. Id. at 984.
165. 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 462
U.S. 669 (1983).
166. Id. at 451.
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coverage to the insured spouses of its male employees. 67 The district
court upheld the policy on the ground that the PDA pertained to female
employees only; therefore, the exclusionary policy could be sustained be-
cause employees' spouses did not fall within the class of persons entitled
to statutory protection.'6 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the
disparity in receiving pregnancy benefits constituted "impermissible" dis-
crimination under the PDA.'69 Recognizing the arduous task lower
courts faced in interpreting the PDA, the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari.1
70
Affirming the Fourth Circuit's judgment, the majority held that the
scope of the PDA is not so limited as to exclude the spouses of employees
from its protection.1 71 The Court emphasized that Congress enacted the
PDA "to protect all individuals from sex discrimination in employment-
including but not limited to pregnant women workers., 72 Thus, the ma-
jority interpreted the PDA broadly by deeming male employees entitled
to PDA protection in order to rectify the policy's discriminatory effect on
male employees whose spouses were denied coverage.'73 Moreover, the
Court explicitly mandated that the PDA equates discrimination based on
pregnancy with express, gender-based discrimination, thus automatically
triggering disparate treatment analysis.'
74
Recently, the Sixth Circuit, in Grant v. General Motors Corp. ,175 fol-
lowed the decisions of the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court prece-
dent in Newport News.' 76 Grant involved a Title VII challenge to a fetal
protection policy that excluded all fertile women from positions that
would expose them to certain levels of lead. 77 The district court, charac-
terizing the policy as facially neutral, upheld the measure under the busi-
ness necessity defense by adhering to pre-PDA principles.' 7 s The court
167. h1. at 449.
168. Id. at 450.
169. Id. at 451.
170. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
171. Id. at 685.
172. Id. at 681 (citing 123 Cong. Rec. 7539 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams)).
173. See id at 684. The majority explained that "[t]he Pregnancy Discrimination Act
has now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman's
pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex." Id.
174. Id.
175. 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990).
176. See supra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
177. Grant, 908 F.2d at 1304. The Grant court noted that the objective of General
Motors' policy was "'to protect fetuses which women of childbearing age may be carrying,
knowingly or unknowingly."' Id. at 1305.
178. Itd at 1304. Restating the district court's rationale, the Fourth Circuit wrote,
"[d]espite the policy's explicit ban on women performing certain tasks, the district court
treated the fetal protection policy as facially neutral and applied disparate impact analysis
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of appeals, however, reversed, holding that the PDA mandates that a pol-
icy discriminating against women based on their ability to conceive chil-
dren constitutes express gender discrimination; therefore, the court
determined, the company policy could only be validated if a BFOQ
existed.179 Justifying its characterization of the policy as facially discrimi-
natory, the Sixth Circuit cited to the PDA as clearly stating that discrimi-
nation on the basis of pregnancy or childbearing capacity must be
considered explicit gender discrimination. 180 The Supreme Court deci-
sion in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. reaffirmed
this interpretation of the PDA.'
III. AFFORDING WOMEN GREATER RGIITS IN THE WORKPLACE: TiE
SUPREME COURT'S RECLASSIFICATION OF THE FETAL
PROTECTION POLICY
A. The Supreme Court's Repudiation of the Modified Business
Necessity Defense for Fetal Protection Policies
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Johnson Controls in large part
to determine whether fetal protection policies should be analyzed under
disparate treatment/BFOQ or disparate impact/business necessity princi-
ples." 2 The Court unanimously'8 3 repudiated both the district and cir-
cuit courts' characterization of Johnson Controls' policy that excluded
fertile women from lead exposure jobs as facially neutral.'" By rejecting
the Seventh Circuit's classification of fetal protection policies as facially
neutral measures to be examined under the disparate impact framework,
the Supreme Court invalidated the modified business necessity defense
for fetal protection policies developed by the Fourth Circuit in Wright v.
to resolve the plaintiff's sex discrimination claim." Id. at 1306. The district court reasoned
"that the potential danger to fetuses from lead exposure justified GM's adoption of its fetal
protection policy as a matter of 'business necessity."' Id
179. Id.
180. Grant, 908 F.2d at 1308 ("The PDA ... inexorably lead to the conclusion that fetal
protection policies which disqualify fertile women... must be characterized as facially
discriminatory.. . ."). The Grant court went on to criticize the Fourth Circuit's "inelucta-
ble conclusion in Wright v. Olin Corp. by essentially overlooking of the PDA." Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
181. See infra notes 229-42 and accompanying text.
182. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1202 (1991).
183. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Marshall, Ste-
vens, O'Connor and Souter. Justice White issued a concurring opinion in which the Chief
Justice and Justice Kennedy joined. Justice Scalia delivered a separate concurring opinion.
Id. at 1199.




Olin Corp.,185 and adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Hayes v. Shelby
Memorial Hospital.18 6
The Johnson Controls Court recharacterized the expressly exclusionary
company policy as facially discriminatory; therefore, the Court deter-
mined, it explicitly violated Section 703 of Title VII in the absence of a
BFOQ.187 Thus, the company could only designate female sterility as a
BFOQ if the employer could demonstrate that fertile women could not
perform their occupational tasks as well as infertile women.' 88 Under
this strict job-relatedness standard, it would be virtually impossible for
any employer to establish female sterility as a BFOQ.
The Court refused to characterize the policy as facially neutral and per-
mit the employer to justify it under the business necessity test because the
company drafted the policy in terms that directly excluded women on the
basis of their childbearing capabilities while leaving male employees un-
restricted. 89 The Court denounced Johnson Controls' policy because it
applied only to its women employees notwithstanding evidence of the
deleterious effects of lead on the male reproductive system.190 Further-
more, the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's classification of the policy
as neutral on the ground that the company purportedly instituted it with
the goal of protecting children, rather than to exclude women. 19' In ad-
monishing the Seventh Circuit for using an employer's alleged motiva-
tions as the basis for characterizing the policy as facially neutral, the
Supreme Court explained that motive is irrelevant in ascertaining
whether a policy can be sustained under the BFOQ exception.' 92 Thus,
courts must confine their examination to the policy's language alone,
without considering the employer's presumed reasons for establishing
it.19  Applying the facts in Johnson Controls to this rule, the Court stated
185. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
186. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
187. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1204.
188. See iU. at 1204, 1207.
189. Id. at 1202-03.
190. Id. at 1200, 1203; see supra note 17.
191. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203 ("The [circuit] court assumed that because the
asserted reason for the sex-based exclusion (protecting women's unconceived offspring)
was ostensibly benign, the policy was not sex-based discrimination. That assumption, how-
ever, was incorrect."). In rejecting the Seventh Circuit's argument that a fetal protection
policy is neutral because the employer purportedly enacted it with benevolent intentions,
the Court mandated that "the absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially
discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect." Id. at 1203-04.
192. Id.
193. Id. In explaining its position, the Court stated: "Whether an employment practice
involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why
the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination." Id. at
1204. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun's opinion cited Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
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that the company's purported beneficent objective for instituting the pol-
icy did not alter its discriminatory nature or entitle the policy to a label of
neutrality.194 The Johnson Controls Court properly refused to be lured
into the erroneous reasoning of the Fourth, Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits that the employer's subjective motivations will lessen the inten-
sity of a fetal protection policy by transforming it into a neutral mea-
sure.195 The Supreme Court's refusal to consider intent in determining
whether the employer could justify the policy under the BFOQ exception
affords women the meaningful protection from being relegated to obey-
ing discriminatory policies justified by an employer's apparently altruistic
motivations. 96
After recasting the policy as facially discriminatory, the Court pro-
ceeded to analyze whether Johnson Controls could justify the policy
under the BFOQ exception. 197 Relying on the "terms of restriction" con-
tained in Section 703(e) of Title VII, the Court concluded that the female
sterility requirement at issue in Johnson Controls could not qualify as a
BFOQ because that defense is only available in those "'certain in-
stances"' where the qualification is "'reasonably necessary to the 'normal
operation' of that 'particular' business."'198 Justice Blackmun's opinion
emphasized that the "most telling" term in the BFOQ statute is "'occupa-
tional"' which he defined as meaning only "objective" and "verifiable"
job-requirements that are essential to the business's normal function-
ing.199 Utilizing this definition, the Court emphasized that nothing in the
record indicated that fertile women were any less able to fulfill their oc-
cupational responsibilities than infertile women; therefore, no BFOQ
could be established. °00 The Court further noted that, because the policy
was not job-related, it certainly failed to satisfy the Dothard standard-
that the qualification must go to the "'essence"' of the particular busi-
ness." 2
01
400 U.S. 542 (1971), as supporting the proposition that the "motives underlying the em-
ployers' express exclusion of women did not alter the intentionally discriminatory charac-
ter of the policy." d.
194. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203-04.
195. Id. at 1204 ("The beneficence of an employer's purpose does not undermine the
conclusion that an explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under § 703(a) and
thus may be defended only as a BFOQ.").
196. See id
197. Id. at 1204.
198. Id. (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)
(1988)).
199. Id.




Justice White, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the Court's charac-
terization of the policy as overt, gender-based discrimination, in contra-
vention of Title VII unless the employer successfully raises the
affirmative BFOQ defense.2" However, Justice White disputed the
Court's narrow reading of the BFOQ provision as containing "terms of
restriction.""2 3 Instead, he interpreted the statutory term "'occupational
qualification,"' broadly to encompass any ability the employer deemed
appropriate for the job, rather than as meaning only a qualification nor-
mally related to that particular business.2" Under this analysis, Justice
White reasoned that female sterility is an "'occupational qualifica-
tion.'""05 However, Justice White explained that the next issue to con-
sider was whether the occupational qualification comported with the
statutory exception of being "'reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of making batteries."' 20 6 On this point, he agreed with Justice Black-
mun's opinion that it was not.2
By reading the BFOQ exception narrowly, the Johnson Controls Court
intimated that a fetal protection policy could never establish a BFOQ
because no reasonable relation could ever exist between fetal health and
occupational capabilities.20" Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the
Seventh Circuit's conclusion that an employer's general concern for the
unborn can justify a fetal protection policy under the BFOQ defense.2" 9
In contrast, Justice White denounced the Court for implying that a fetal
protection policy could never qualify as a BFOQ.21 ° Conceding that the
BFOQ exception is a "difficult standard to satisfy," he focused on the fact
that the statutory language does not restrict its application to fetal protec-
tion policies.211 Providing an example, Justice White stated that a fetal
protection policy should be upheld under the statutory exception if en-
202. Id. at 1210 (White, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 1204 (opinion of Court).
204. Id. at 1210 n.1 (White, J., concurring). Citing Webster's Dictionary, Justice White





208. I& at 1206 (opinion of Court). In espousing this position, the Court explained:
"The unconceived fetuses of Johnson Controls' female employees... are neither custom-
ers nor third parties whose safety is essential to the business of battery manufacturing." Id.
209. Id. at 1206-07. Refusing to justify the policy on the ground that the employer is
concerned with protecting potential life, Justice Blackmun proclaimed that "[n]o one can
disregard the possibility of injury to future children; the BFOQ, however, is not so broad
that it transforms this deep social concern into an essential aspect of batterymaking." I&
at 1206.
210. Id. at 1210 (White, J., concurring).
211. Id.
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acted due to employer concerns about potential tort liability.2 12 Thus,
Justice White posited that preventing injury to employees and third par-
ties should be considered important components of Johnson Controls'
business.
213
B. The Court's Rejection of Industrial "Safety Concerns" as Sufficient
to Validate Fetal Protection Policies
The Johnson Controls Court sharply criticized Justice White's conten-
tion that Johnson Controls' industrial "safety concerns" with fetal health
established a BFOQ.21 4 The Court discounted this argument by distin-
guishing the instant matter from previous cases in which an industrial
"safety concern" qualified as a BFOQ.21 5 The Court enunciated that
safety considerations will only permit a facially discriminatory policy to
succeed under the BFOQ exception if promoting safety constitutes an
essential occupational task and if a woman's ability to ensure the safety of
third-parties becomes impaired.216
Citing previous circuit decisions in which third-party safety concerns
established a BFOQ, Justice White faulted the Court for failing to extend
that principle to find that fetal safety concerns could also justify a facially
discriminatory policy.217 Applying the "'essence of the business"' test,
Justice White asserted that fetal safety should be construed as going to
the "essence" of ordinary operation of the battery manufacturing facil-
ity.218 Citing Western Air Lines v. Criswel 219 and Dothard v. Rawlin-
son,22 Justice White delineated that Johnson Controls' concerns for the
health and safety of its employees' offspring are as strong as an airline
company's passenger safety concerns.221 Thus, he suggested that the
same industrial "safety concerns" that sustained policies under BFOQ
analysis in Dothard and Criswell should be extended to fetal protection
policies. 2 2 Justice White argued that a concern for the well-being of the
female employees' children goes to the "essence" of the battery making
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1205-06 (opinion of court).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1206. The Court emphasized that free choice must be afforded to women by
asserting that "[fletal, as opposed to passenger, safety was best left to the mother." Id.
217. Id. at 1212 (White, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 1213 n.5.
219. 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985).
220. 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).




business, thus qualifying as a BFOQ.2z This strained argument resem-
bles the holdings in Wright v. Olin Corp.'"4 and Hayes v. Shelby Memo-
rial Hospital,"5 in which the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits expanded the
industrial "safety concern" to include an employer's concern for the
health of its employees' potential offspring." 6
The Johnson Controls Court wisely rejected the circuit courts' ex-
panded application of the industrial safety consideration as a justification
for upholding fetal protection policies.2" In doing so, the Supreme Court
refused to adopt the broadened use of the BFOQ exception to include
policies motivated by safety concerns, and reaffirmed the position that
decisions regarding the type of employment one will accept are personal
choices that must be made by women and their families, not by their
employers."
8
C. The PDA: A Critical Addition to Title VII's Definition Section
In justifying its decision in Johnson Controls to classify fetal protection
policies as facially discriminatory, the Supreme Court properly relied on
the express language of the 1978 amendment to Title VII, mandating that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or "related medical conditions"
(i.e., childbearing capacity) be treated the same as express discrimination
on the basis of gender." 9 The Court looked to its previous holding in
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,2 O in which it
interpreted the PDA as making "'[c]lear that, for all Title VII purposes,
discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy [or capability for
childbearing] is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex,'"" thus
directly violating Section 703(a) of Title VII in the absence of a BFOQ.1
2
In addition to the definitional clarification, the Court emphasized that the
223. Id. at 1213 n.5.
224. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
225. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
226. See supra notes 62-96 and accompanying text.
227. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206-07.
228. Id. at 1206-07, 1210. Describing the importance of allowing women to be able to
make their own employment decisions, the Court explained that "[i]t is no more appropri-
ate for the courts than it is for individual employers to decide whether a woman's repro-
ductive role is more important to herself and her family than her economic role. Congress
has left this choice to the woman as hers to make." Id at 1210.
229. Id at 1206.
230. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
231. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684).
232. Id at 1204. Detailing its interpretation of the PDA, the Johnson Controls Court
stated: "Under the PDA, such a classification must be regarded ... in the same light as
explicit sex discrimination. Respondent has chosen to treat all its female employees as
potentially pregnant; that choice evinces discrimination on the basis of sex." Id at 1203.
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PDA further strengthened Title VII by setting the standard that women
may only be restricted from jobs where their pregnancy or childbearing
capabilities impair job performance. 3 This provision appears to supple-
ment the general Title VII BFOQ exception that the qualification or re-
striction must be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of the
battery manufacturing business.3 4
The PDA should be interpreted as dictating that discrimination against
women based on pregnancy or "related medical conditions" be evaluated
under the existing Section 703(a) of Title VII unless the employer can
establish a BFOQ under the existing Section 703(e).3 5 Moreover, any
challenged measure must not contravene the PDA's separate require-
ment that pregnant women or women with "related medical conditions"
be treated the same as other women "in their ability or inability to
work.' ,236 This statutory restriction for occupational abilities shows that
fetal safety concerns that bear no relationship to job performance do not
pass either the PDA test of job-relatedness or the general BFOQ
defense. 7
By focusing on the express language of the PDA, Justice Blackmun's
opinion correctly explained that the provision requires discrimination on
the basis of childbearing to be analyzed the same as overt gender discrim-
233. Id. at 1206.
234. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988). Emphasizing the impact of the PDA's
precise requirements, the Court concluded that "[t]he PDA's amendment to Title VII con-
tains a BFOQ standard of its own: unless pregnant employees differ from others 'in their
ability or inability to work,' they must be 'treated the same' as other employees 'for all
employment-related purposes."' Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1988)). The Court elaborated that "[t]his language clearly sets forth Congress'
remedy for discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and potential pregnancy.... In other
words, women as capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced
to choose between having a child and having a job." Id.
In contrast, Justice White interpreted the PDA as an addition to Title VII's definition
section that "did not restrict the scope of the BFOQ defense." Id. at 1213 (White, J.,
concurring). Diverging from the Court's interpretation, Justice White stated that the PDA
does not modify the gender discrimination provisions under Title VII in any fashion. Id.
In reaching his conclusion, Justice White apparently disregarded the second sentence of the
PDA, id. at 1206, requiring that women capable of childbearing "shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988); see supra note 11 (setting
forth statutory language). Justice Blackmun's majority opinion correctly interpreted this
clause as providing substantive value by containing "a BFOQ standard of its own." John-
son Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206. Responding to "the concurrence['s] assert[ion] that the
PDA did not alter the BFOQ defense," Justice Blackmun accused Justice White of
"seek[ing] to read the second clause of the Act." Id.
235. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
237. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206.
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ination, thus warranting disparate treatment analysis. 38 Justice Black-
mun's reading of the PDA not only comports with the statutory language,
but also indicates an appropriate adherence to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC.39 Fur-
thermore, the Johnson Controls Court followed the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits' interpretations of the PDA in Grant v. General Motors Corp.24°
and Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 2 41 respectively, in
which those courts characterized policies discriminating against the preg-
nant and potentially pregnant as equivalent to overt gender discrim-
ination. 4'
D. Potential Risk to the Fetus Does Not Justify a Restriction on
Free Choice
The Supreme Court impugned Johnson Controls' employment qualifi-
cation measure as amounting to overt, gender discrimination because it
explicitly restricted women from making their own occupational decisions
while leaving men free to make such choices for themselves. 2 43
238. Id. at 1203.
239. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
240. 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990).
241. 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1981).
242. See supra notes 140-46, 175-80 and accompanying text.
243. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196,1202 (1991).
In describing the paternalistic nature of Johnson Controls' policy, Justice Blackmun em-
phasized that "[flertile men, but not fertile women, are given a choice as to whether they
wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular job." Id. Justice Blackmun's opinion
of the Court further explained that the company policy was "concerned only with the
harms that may befall the unborn offspring of its female employees." Id. at 1203.
Although the Court thoroughly depicted the bias inherent in the company policy, Justice
Blackmun's opinion, as well as the two separate concurrences, failed to accentuate the
policy's overinclusive nature. Grossman, supra note 121, at 1616 (discussing the potential
for a BFOQ requirement to be overinclusive in certain circumstances); EDUCATON AND
LABOR REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (discussing the overinclusive nature of fetal protection
policies generally). The report explains:
these policies are often too broad, excluding women who are not at risk. For
example, many exclude all fertile women simply because they may become preg-
nant, regardless of their age, marital status, birth control method, sexual prefer-
ence, or intention to bear children. These policies disregard a woman's right to be
treated as an individual (rather than on the basis of group characteristics), and
ignore the fact that most individual women workers are not likely to become
pregnant unless they choose to do so.
Id. Specifically, the company's purported motivation for implementing the 1984 policy was
to protect children born to employees from the undocumented harmful effects of lead ex-
posure. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200. However, the policy applied even-
handedly to every fertile woman regardless of whether or not she already had all the chil-
dren she desired, never intended to have children, or was technically fertile, but beyond
the age where she could safely bear a child. See id.; EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT,
supra note 10, at 9. Therefore, the policy extended coverage far beyond the people within
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By asserting that the company policy constituted explicit gender dis-
crimination because the policy did not apply to male employees, notwith-
standing the potential harmful effects of lead exposure on men, the Court
failed to acknowledge that an explicit gender-based policy remains
facially discriminatory regardless of whether men also experienced nega-
tive effects from lead.'" Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, accurately
pointed out this flaw in the Court's reasoning.24
However, the fact that Johnson Controls did not restrict male employ-
ees' participation in lead exposure jobs remains significant for another
reason. The fact that the policy pertained exclusively to women suggests
that Johnson Controls' rationale for the measure was rooted in the gener-
alization that women need guidance in making decisions regarding per-
sonal choices while men do not." The Court has long invalidated
policies based on such gender stereotypes.247
In an ill-fated attempt to justify this restriction on free choice, Justice
White cited Dothard v. Rawlinson'-m to support the proposition that such
limitations on employment can be justified if a threat of imminent harm
the class that the policy was designed to protect. Thus, the policy violated the Supreme
Court's rule in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978), that an employer provision which treats women as a class, without taking into ac-
count individual differences within that class, violates Title VII's proscriptions against gen-
der discrimination in the work force. Id at 710; EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra
note 10, at 8-9; see supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text. Moreover, the House com-
mittee report depicted the underinclusiveness of fetal protection policies. The report
explained:
fetal protection policies seldom address the health risks posed by workplace
hazards in a comprehensive fashion. Whether employers have disregarded hard
evidence of male-related fetal health risks, or have chosen to avoid finding out if
such risks exist, they have commonly adopted underinclusive policies which serve
neither the interests of workplace health and safety nor the employment rights of
women.
EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 10, at 8-9.
244. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
245. Id. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia disputed the Court's finding that the Johnson
Controls policy impermissibly discriminated against women because it applied only to fe-
male employees, despite evidence of the harmful effects of lead exposure on males. Id.
He explained that even if deleterious effects from air-borne lead never befell men, the
policy would remain violative of the PDA because that provision expressly equates dis-
crimination on the basis of female fertility with intolerable discrimination on the basis of
gender. See id. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, the policy should be invalidated without
ever reaching the issue of the potential consequences of lead upon male battery manufac-
turing employees. Id.
246. See id. at 1202 (opinion of Court).
247. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); Phillips v. Martin Mari-
etta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 546 (1970) (Marshall, J., concurring); supra notes 115, 122, 129
and accompanying text.
248. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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to women exists.249 However, Justice White failed to point out that the
restriction on free choice sustained in Dothard is the exception, not the
rule.5 ° In that case, the Dothard Court emphasized that a facially dis-
criminatory policy could be justified, notwithstanding the restriction on
personal decision-making, only in extremely narrow circumstances in
which women confronted an inescapable threat of harm that prevented
them from performing their central occupational task of ensuring
safety.2 1
Justice White's reliance on Dothard appears misplaced because the
Dothard exception does not warrant application to the dissimilar fact sit-
uation presented in Johnson Controls. In Dothard, a real risk that in-
mates would assault the women guards existed; thus, their very presence
hindered the women employees' ability to fulfill their primary occupa-
tional responsibility of ensuring prison safety. 2 In Johnson Controls,
however, the presence of women in the battery manufacturing business
did not pose a grave risk to their potential offspring, and their exposure
to lead did not interfere with their ability to perform their essential occu-
pational tasks. 3 Hence, the BFOQ justification that the Court accepted
-in Dothard to permit the restriction on free choice does not apply to the
markedly different context presented in Johnson Controls.
Under Johnson Controls, however, Dothard remains good law. Al-
though the risk in Johnson Controls did not justify the fetal protection
policy under the Dothard exception, the Johnson Controls decision does
not preclude the possibility that a gender-based policy could be sustained
under the BFOQ exception if the risk of harm would undermine a wo-
man's ability to perform her job. 4 Only in those narrow instances, how-
ever, would a curtailment of free choice be justified. 255
IV. CoMMENT: THE AFTERMATH OF JOHNSON CONTROLS: PENDING
LITIGATION IN INTERNA TIONAL UNION, UA W LOCAL 1829
v. EXIDE CORPORATION
While the Supreme Court deliberated Johnson Controls, union workers
in the small town of West Burlington, Iowa, anxiously awaited the high
249. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1212-13 (White, J., concurring); see supra note 126
and accompanying text.
250. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-36.
251. Id.; Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1205 (opinion of Court).
252. Id.
253. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1208.
254. See id. at 1205.
255. See id.; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977); see supra notes 126-28
and accompanying text.
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court's ruling that would directly affect the Milwaukee State Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission's probable cause determination in In-
ternational Union, UAW v. Exide Corp.'5 6 The Exide case involves a
matter analogous to Johnson Controls. An Iowa battery manufacturing
company, Exide Corporation, instituted an exclusionary policy in 1988 in
which the company indicated that it would no longer hire fertile women
to work in areas of the plant where they would be exposed to airborne
lead.257 In applying the policy, the company asked every woman candi-
date during her interview, as well as on her job application, to disclose
whether or not she was physically capable of bearing children. s58 Exide
also required its female employees to sign an elaborate consent form, de-
lineating the risks of lead exposure on the fetus. The company did not
require its male employees to sign the consent form,259 nor did the com-
pany inquire into male applicants' fertility despite scientific data docu-
menting the potential harmful effects of lead exposure on males.260
256. Local 1829 and Int'l Union v. Exide Corp., Charge No. 260-90-0656 (EEOC July
10, 1992) (determination) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review) [hereinafter
Exide Charge]; see Brenda Woody, Fired Worker Keeps Eye on High Court, Trm HAwK
EYE, Dec. 2, 1990, at Al, A10; Telephone Interview with Joan Bertin, Associate Professor,
Columbia University School of Public Health; former Associate Director, American Civil
Liberties Union's Women's Rights Project; and author, Amicus Brief for ACLU Women's
Law Project, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991)
(No. 89-1215), (Mar. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Bertin Interview]; see also infra note 278 (dis-
cussing the requisite procedures a complainant must follow to establish a Title VII claim).
257. Exide Corporation, Plant Pre-Employment Information for Female Applicants:
Fetal Protection Policy, (Aug. 1988) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review)
[hereinafter Exide's Fetal Protection Policy]. Exide's original fetal protection policy states,
in pertinent part:
Women of child-bearing potential ("fertile females") are defined as any female
who has not entered menopause or who has not had a surgical sterilization proce-
dure. Use of birth control measures will not alter their status. Women will be
presumed to be capable of reproduction until they medically prove that they are
not capable of bearing children.
Until further research outlines the safe ranges of lead in pregnancy, Exide wishes
to reduce the possibility of adverse health effects on fetuses of pregnant employ-
ees by reducing exposure to lead for all women who are pregnant or are capable
of having children. This will be accomplished by transfer to lower lead exposure
jobs and by the restriction in hiring of any such women to lead exposure jobs.
Id. Telephone Interview with Larry L. Jackson, past President, UAW Local 1829 (Mar. 8,
1993) [hereinafter Jackson Interview].
258. See Exide Charge, supra note 256, at 2.
259. See Exide's Fetal Protection Policy, supra note 257 (requiring every female em-
ployee to sign its fetal protection policy as an indication that she understood and would
comply with its terms).
260. See id. The policy is devoid of any reference to the potential deleterious effects on
males from lead exposure. Id.; see also Bertin Interview, supra note 256; Jackson Inter-
view, supra note 257.
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The company's policy directly victimized former Exide employee,
Tammy D.26 During her hiring interview in August 22, 1990, an Exide
official asked Tammy D. whether or not she was fertile.262 She answered
in the affirmative, but explained that she already had four children, and
that her husband had received a vasectomy; therefore, the couple would
definitely not have any more children.263 Notwithstanding her fertility
status, the supervisor hired Tammy D. because she had prior work experi-
ence in the manufacturing industry and met all objective hiring criteria. 264
The company placed her in an "entry-level job" where she would not be
exposed to lead.265 However, her supervisor informed her that once she
acquired seniority, she could be transferred into a higher paying position
in a division that would expose her to airborne lead.
2 66
After she worked in an exemplary manner for a mere three weeks, the
company unilaterally terminated her on September 5, 1990.267 When
asked for an explanation of the grounds for her dismissal, Exide in-
formed her that they fired her because she did not submit to sterili-
zation, despite the fact that she could eventually be eligible for a posi-
tion in the lead industry.2 68 Exide then informed Tammy D. of the
261. See Exide Charge, supra note 256. In addition to the UAW Local 1829 action
against Exide, Tammy D. filed a separate charge against the company claiming that the
employer fetal protection policy contravened Title VII and caused her to be illegally termi-
nated. See Tammy D. v. Exide Corp., Charge No. 260-91-0053 (EEOC July 10, 1992) (on
file with the Catholic University Law Review) [hereinafter Tammy D.]; Gene Erb, 'Fetal
Protection' Policy Leaves Some Iowans Feeling Victimized, DEs MoiwNFs REGISTER, Oct.
15, 1990, at Al (describing the plight of Tammy D.).
262. Erb, supra note 261, at Al. The reporter explained that "Tammy D... had no
idea why the company wanted to know about her family plans when she interviewed for a
job at the Exide Battery Co. plant in Burlington." Id.
263. Id.; see Tammy D., supra note 261, at 2. The EEOC probable cause determination
in the matter of Tammy D. v. Exide Corp. states that "[blecause her husband had a vasec-
tomy she responded that she could not have any children." Id.
264. See Tammy D., supra note 261, at 2; see also Jackson Interview, supra note 257.
265. Woody, supra note 256, at Al.
266. Id. The article stated that Tammy D. "began working at an entry-level job in an
area free of lead exposure. However, she understood that in time, as she gained seniority,
she could be promoted into an area where the exposure to lead would be greater" and
where she would receive a higher salary. Id.
267. Erb, supra note 261, at Al.
268. Id. In response to the employer's termination decision, Tammy D. explained:
"I told him [the Exide supervisor for whom she worked] that I could prove that
my husband has had a vasectomy. We have four kids. The oldest is 12. The
youngest is 6. We don't plan to have any more. But that wasn't good enough. He
said something might happen to my husband. I might remarry and decide to have
more kids."
Id. at Al, A8. The fact that Tammy D.'s employer was concerned with her childbearing
status, as well as her present and future marital status, demonstrates that the company
exceeded its bounds of ensuring that its workers possessed the qualifications to perform
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company policy that forbade fertile women from working in the lead
industry. 69
Tammy D., as well as other female employees of Exide, brought the
company's discriminatory practices to the attention of International
Union, UAW Local 1829 President, Larry Jackson."O On behalf of the
union, Mr. Jackson filed a charge with the Milwaukee district office of the
EEOC, charging that Exide's exclusionary policy violated Title VII's
prohibitions against gender discrimination in the workplace.27
Instead of expeditiously responding with an initial probable cause de-
termination, the EEOC awaited the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson
Controls.272 However, even after the Court issued its decision in Johnson
Controls, the Milwaukee EEOC did not immediately respond with its
probable cause determination regarding Exide's exclusionary policy. In
direct response to the Supreme Court ruling, though, Exide promptly re-
scinded its express fetal protection policy.2 73 Yet the company continued
its practice of excluding women from positions in the lead industry by
contemporaneously substituting the explicit policy with a different prac-
their job satisfactorily by investigating other, non-job related characteristics of its female
employees. According to Professor Leroy Clark, the fact that the company forbade her
from working in the lead industry, although her husband underwent a vasectomy, revealed
that her employer was essentially accusing her of "committing adultery." Interview with
Leroy Clark, Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law (Mar. 16, 1993).
269. See Stephan Cohen, Firedl Because She Might Have Another Child, WoMAN's
WORLD, Oct. 5, 1991, at 7. Displaying her discontent with Exide's exclusionary policy,
Tammy D. responded, "Why should my boss tell me what to do with my body? ... That's
wrong!" Id.; see also Woody, supra, note 256, at Al (discussing Tammy D.'s response to
Exide's policy).
270. See Tammy D., supra note 261. In addition to Tammy D.'s separate action against
Exide, two other former women employees, Patty M. and Helen R., whom the Company
also terminated on the ground that they could not prove infertility, brought charges against
Exide before the EEOC, Milwaukee District Office. Patty M. applied for a job in the lead
industry with Exide in August of 1988. Patty M. v. Exide Corp., Charge No. 260-90-0654
(EEOC July 10, 1992) (determination) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
However, a company official informed her that she could not submit an application unless
she could provide proof from her doctor attesting to her infertility. Id. She responded that
she could not offer such proof because she was in fact fertile. Id. Thus, the Exide officer
refused to accept her application, notwithstanding the fact that her extensive prior employ-
ment experience in the factory industry revealed that she possessed the requisite job quali-
fications for a position with Exide. Id. Helen R. filed a separate complaint in which she
alleged that Exide violated Title VII's prohibitions against gender discrimination in the
workplace because the company rejected her employment application on the ground that
she refused to sign a form stating that she would comply with the company's fetal protec-
tion policy. Helen R. v. Exide Corp., Charge No. 260-90-0655 (EEOC July 10, 1992) (de-
termination) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
271. Exide Charge, supra note 256.




tice.274 Exide began requiring its female employees to view graphic films
at annual meetings and to attend "educational programs" depicting the
potential negative impact on fetuses from lead exposure and strongly ad-
vising fertile women against accepting any position that would expose
them to lead. 75 The film did not discuss the debilitating effects of lead
exposure on males, nor did it explain that women's personal choices with
respect to childbearing bore no relation to their job of battery-manufac-
turing.276 In conducting its investigation of the union's charge against Ex-
ide, the Milwaukee EEOC uncovered this new practice, designed to
accomplish the same unlawful end as Exide's former exclusionary
policy.
2 77
Finally, on July 10, 1992, the Milwaukee EEOC issued its probable
cause determination in favor of the union.278 It determined that, under
274. Exide Corp., Reproductive and Fetal Hazards, (Mar. 25, 1991) (on file with the
Catholic University Law Review) (consisting of Exide's revised fetal protection policy in
the wake of Johnson Controls). The new policy states in pertinent part:
The recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in UAW v. John-
son Controls, Inc. now prohibits employers from utilizing fetal protection policies
which involuntarily exclude fertile women from lead-exposed jobs. The Supreme
Court has held that employers may not restrict the employment opportunities of
their employees because of the hazards to an unborn fetus ....
Training and Counseling of All Applicants/Employees
1. All current Exide employees will be required to attend a training session in
which a video presentation will be shown regarding the adverse effects of lead on
the male and female reproductive systems and on the unborn fetus.... Employ-
ees will be required to sign an Attendance Roster... to which will be attached a
copy of the document entitled "Effects of Lead on Human Reproduction and
Fetal Health."
Id.; see infra note 276.
275. Id.
276. See id. The revised Exide policy statement claims that its video presentation de-
picts "the adverse effects of lead on the male and female reproductive systems." Id. How-
ever, according to former UAW Local 1829 Union President, Larry Jackson, the video
program only described the potential harmful effects from lead on female employees, with-
out addressing the possible adverse impact on males. Jackson Interview, supra note 257.
Mr. Jackson attended the annual meeting when Exide delivered its video presentation;
hence, he had first-hand knowledge of the content of the presentation. Id.
277. Bertin Interview, supra note 256.
278. See Exide Charge, supra note 256. Section 706(b) of Title VII sets forth the proce-
dures for commencing a legal action under this Title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(f) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991). Prior to filing a civil suit in federal district
court, a party charging a Title VII violation must follow the requisite pre-trial proceedings,
the first of which requires the complainant to submit a "charge" with the district EEOC
office where the alleged violation transpired. See id § 2000e-5(b). After conducting an
investigation, if the EEOC determines that "reasonable cause" exists that a defendant-
employer contravened Title VII, the EEOC will issue a "determination," which merely
serves as a preliminary finding that a potential Title VII violation exists. See id. Upon
issuing the "determination" the Commission will attempt "to eliminate any such alleged
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Johnson Controls, probable cause existed that both the direct removal
policy, as well as the videotape program, constituted impermissible gen-
der discrimination under Title VII.' 79 Although that the Johnson Con-
trols Court did not directly confront the issue of whether or not programs
devised to dissuade fertile women from accepting jobs in the lead indus-
try violated Title VII, the EEOC's probable cause determination stated
that the company's video presentation also "establish[ed] a violation of
Title VII," as amended by the PDA. 0
Thus, the critical question of the breadth of Johnson Controls remains
unanswered. In the pending Exide matter, the unresolved issue endures
of whether or not the holding of Johnson Controls can be applied to
invalidate a mandatory company program designed to persuade women
to refuse lead-exposure positions. However, the influential precedent of
Johnson Controls,"1 the revised EEOC policy guidance,m' as well as
political responses and subsequent judicial applications of the decision,
283
clearly demonstrate that the Johnson Controls holding can be readily ap-
plied to invalidate the video program established to entice women into
accepting lower paying positions in the non-lead industry.
unlawful employment practice by informal means of conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion." Id. If the parties fail to resolve their dispute by these informal means within 30
days, the EEOC will either bring suit against the employer on behalf of the aggrieved
party, or the EEOC can elect against pursuing the case, and can instead issue a "right to
sue letter," in which the EEOC instead authorizes the plaintiff(s) to bring suit against the
alleged Title VII violator. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). A Title VII plaintiff is entitled to a
"right to sue letter" within 180 days of the date on which the EEOC issued the probable
cause determination. See id.; see also ARTHUR B. SMrrH, JR., ET AL. EMPLOYmENT Dis-
CRIMiNATIoN LAW 731-69 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing the administrative procedures involved
in bringing a Title VII claim ).
In the instant case against Exide, the matter is currently in the "conference, conciliation
and persuasion" phase. Bertin Interview, supra note 256. The author emphasizes that this
Comment in no way discusses, nor does the author possess any information pertaining to
any issues or facts regarding any informal negotiation, settlement and conciliation efforts
in this matter. Such discussions are prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). Ac-
cording to the procedures outlined above, however, if Exide fails to be resolved by these
informal means, it is possible that either the EEOC or the private plaintiffs could bring suit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the very same
court in which International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991),
originated.
279. See Exide Charge, supra note 256.
280. Id. at 2.
281. See infra notes 284-91 and accompanying text.
282. See infra notes 292-304 and accompanying text.
283. See infra notes 305-10 and accompanying text.
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A. Applying the Johnson Controls Rationale to Invalidate the Exide
Video Presentation
In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court made a sweeping pronounce-
ment that employer fetal protection policies, established to prevent fertile
women from working in the lead industry, would not be validated.'8 In
large part, the Johnson Controls Court based its decision on the fact that
such policies facially discriminate on the basis of sex and that no BFOQ
for female sterility exists in the lead industry.285 Moreover, the Johnson
Controls Court emphasized the important point-further revealing the
policy's unfairness-that males may be adversely affected by lead expo-
sure, yet the company policy exclusively applied to its female employ-
ees.
2 86
The Johnson Controls rationale can be applied to invalidate Exide's
mandatory videotape practice. The Johnson Controls Court outlawed an
employer policy that directly excluded women;2 7 therefore, the federal
district court" 8 should not sustain a policy that seeks to accomplish the
same impermissible objective indirectly through the use of one-sided
video presentations that compel women to forego jobs in the lead indus-
try. If a reviewing court were to sustain such indirect policies the end
result would be an evisceration of Johnson Controls. Employers would
merely pay lip service to Johnson Controls by nullifying their express ex-
clusionary policies, and replacing them with less obvious tactics designed
to achieve the same end of baring women from lead exposure positions.
Thus, if the Exide policy were upheld, it would pave the way for future
employers to institute similar measures to accomplish the objective that
the Supreme Court declared illegal in Johnson Controls.
The failure of the video program to emphasize the impact of lead expo-
sure on males apparently reveals that Exide believed women needed gui-
dance in making personal choices while males were capable of making
identical choices without instruction from their employer." 9 Clearly, the
284. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1207-08
(1991).
285. Id. at 1202, 1207-08; see supra notes 187, 197-201 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 17, 189-90 and accompanying text.
287. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1207-08.
288. The author refers to the federal district court to postulate the manner in which that
court may decide Exide if conciliation and arbitration efforts fail and the matter proceeds
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. See supra note
278 (discussing the procedures for bringing a Title VII claim in federal district court).
289. Brenda Woody, ACLU Lawyer Says Fetal Policy Discriminates, Tum HAwK EYE,
Dec. 2, 1990, at Al. The article discusses Joan Bertin's reaction to the Exide policy. Id. In
describing the similarities between the Johnson Controls and Exide policies she stated:
"'We call them sex discrimination... because they create impediments to women's em-
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Exide video program contravenes the Johnson Controls Court's instruc-
tion to employers that "[d]ecisions about the welfare of future children
must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them
rather than to the employers who hire those parents. 290
Invalidating Exide's policy will not only protect women from explicit
exclusionary policies but will also afford them the additional right, logi-
cally flowing from the liberty granted in Johnson Controls, of prohibiting
employers from subjecting women to subtle measures designed to ex-
clude them from the very same positions that the Johnson Controls Court
declared them entitled to obtain.291 Thus, the Johnson Controls rationale
allows for the invalidation of educational programs established to perpet-
uate gender stereotypes and to exclude women from jobs for which they
are qualified. Invalidating the Exide practice would not require the mod-
ification of Johnson Controls's basic holding. To the contrary, nullifying
Exide's practice would further ensure the realization of the Johnson Con-
trols objective of prohibiting gender-based, fetal protection policies, re-
gardless of such policies' form.
B. The Exide Program Cannot Be Sustained Under the EEOC's
Revised Policy Guidance Statement for Fetal Protection Policies
In direct response to Johnson Controls, the EEOC rescinded its three
prior policy guidance statements on fetal protection policies.2 2 These
statements generally required EEOC officials to examine fetal protection
policies under disparate impact principles and allowed employers to de-
fend such policies under the three-prong business necessity test created
by the Fourth Circuit for evaluating fetal protection policies.293 The
ployment that are neither rational nor fair, because they don't have similar concern for the
health of male workers."' Id. Ms. Bertin also pointed out that, like the Johnson Controls
policy, the Exide policy "is used strictly against women-and not against men who may
father future children." Id. at A10. Ms. Bertin explained that "'Johnson [Controls] and
Exide ignored the findings about male vulnerability . . . . The way they translated the
findings was to say women couldn't work."' Id.; see supra notes 243, 246-47 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the paternalistic nature of Johnson Controls' policy that directs wo-
men to work in only confined areas while leaving male employees unrestricted).
290. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1207.
291. See id.
292. See infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
293. See Reproductive/Fetal Hazards, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 624, at 31 (July
1986) (containing the initial fetal policy guidelines). The 1986 guidance mandated that
"[t]he bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception to Title VII protection does
not apply to the situations covered by this manual section." Ud § 624.4, at 33; Notice,
Policy Guidance on Reproductive and Fetal Hazards, 3 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No.
120, at 5 (Oct. 7, 1988) (containing the former fetal protection policy guidance that existed
prior to the Seventh Circuit Johnson Controls decision). The 1988 EEOC policy guidance
recognized the difficulty in determining whether to apply disparate treatment or disparate
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EEOC supplanted its obsolete policy statements with an innovative gui-
dance that directed EEOC officials to analyze fetal protection policies
under the principles enunciated Johnson Controls.294 The revised EEOC
policy guidance serves as an important mechanism to ensure future com-
pliance with the Johnson Controls ruling.2 95 Thus, the revised EEOC
policy guidance statement ensures that the Johnson Controls objective of
impact principles to fetal protection policies. Id. In embracing the approaches of the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits of examining fetal protection policies under disparate impact
principles, the EEOC explained:
The initial question is what framework should be used to analyze cases involv-
ing such policies? In the few cases challenging reproductive and fetal protection
policies aimed at pregnant employees or female employees of child-bearing age
or capacity, the courts have primarily employed an adverse impact/business ne-
cessity framework for analysis.
[.. IThe Commission follows the lead of every court of appeals to [sic] have
addressed the question ... that the business necessity defense applies to these
cases.
Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted); Notice, Policy Guidance on United Auto Workers v. John-
son Controls, 3 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 135, at 19 (Jan 24, 1990) (containing the
EEOC policy guidance based on the Seventh Circuit decision in Johnson Controls in which
the Commission directed its officials to partially disregard the Johnson Controls majority
by continuing to examine fetal protection policies according to its 1988 policy guidance).
This 1990 policy guidance partially stated:
Commission field offices should not rely on the Johnson Controls decision as
guidance for processing "fetal hazards" charges. Employment policies that ex-
clude women on the basis of pregnancy or capacity to become pregnant are dis-
criminatory on their face and employer justifications for such policies must be
examined critically. The majority in Johnson Controls gave undue deference to
the employer's judgment in broadly drawing its exclusionary policy....
The directions for investigation and evaluation of evidence set forth by the
Commission in its interim Policy Guidance on Reproductive and Fetal Hazards,
[the 1988 policy] as elaborated on by this document, should continue to be fol-
lowed in processing charges challenging fetal protection policies.
Id. at 29-30 (footnotes omitted). Although the 1989 policy guidance specified that fetal
protection policies should be construed as facially discriminatory, the guidance explicitly
required that such policies be scrutinized under the three-prong business necessity defense.
Id. at 30.
294. EEOC: Policy Guide on Supreme Court's Johnson Controls Decision, 405 Fair
Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 6941, 6943 (June 28, 1991) [hereinafter Current Policy Gui-
dance] ("In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls, Compliance Man-
ual Section 624 (Reproductive and Fetal Hazards) and the Commission's prior policy
guidance issuances on fetal protection policies are hereby rescinded, and the mode of anal-
ysis set forth in those documents should no longer be applied." (footnote omitted)).
295. See id. The EEOC's current policy guidance clearly enunciates that "[a]s a result
of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls, policies that exclude members of one
sex from a workplace for the purpose of protecting fetuses cannot be justified under Title
VII." Id. (footnote omitted).
1993)
Catholic University Law Review
enabling women to attain enhanced protections in the workplace will be
effectuated.
296
The EEOC policy guidance is not drafted in terms that would limit its
application to expressly written employer policies that unequivocally ex-
clude women from positions where they would be exposed to lead.2 In-
stead, the broad language utilized in the policy guidance reveals its intent
to encompass any type of fetal protection policy, regardless of whether it
takes the form of an explicit prohibition or manifests itself in a so-called
educational program.2 98 The policy guidance simply states that "policies
... protecting fetuses cannot be justified under Title VII."2 99 The gui-
dance does not restrict the word "policies" to only certain forms of em-
ployer measures designed to exclude women from jobs based on their
fertility, a criteria wholly unrelated to their ability to perform their job of
battery-manufacturing." 0 Clearly, the policy guidance's fundamental
purpose is to prohibit employers from instituting any type of gender-
based exclusionary measures.
30 1
Despite the fact that the Exide program does not go so far as to di-
rectly forbid women from obtaining work in the lead industry, the pro-
gram achieves the same illegal goal as express policies of dictating
women's employment choices.30 2 Therefore, under the revised EEOC
policy guidance, Exide's program should be treated identically to both the
former Exide policy that expressly barred women from these positions,3"3
and the exclusionary policy that the Johnson Controls Court declared vio-
lative of Title VII.3 °1 Only if courts apply the rationale delineated in the
revised EEOC policy guidance to all employer measures that exclude wo-
men on the basis of their fertility, regardless of their form, will Johnson
296. See id. The policy guidance declares that "[i]ndividuals who can perform the es-
sential functions of a job must be considered eligible for employment, regardless of the
presence of workplace hazards to fetuses." Id. By determining that fetal protection poli-
cies may no longer be sustained under the three-prong business necessity defense and in-
stead requiring that such policies be treated as facial discrimination on the basis of gender,
the policy statement affords women greater rights in the workplace by ensuring that the




299. Id. (emphasis added).
300. Id.
301. See id.
302. See supra note 17 (discussing the deleterious effects from lead exposure on males).
303. See supra note 257 (depicting Exide's exclusionary policy).
304. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1207-08
(1991); see supra note 16 (containing Johnson Controls's exclusionary policy).
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Controls truly achieve the goal of safeguarding women from discrimina-
tory employment policies.
C. Political Reactions and Subsequent Judicial Applications of Johnson
Controls Will Not Allow the Exide Program to Be Sustained
In the wake of intense political pressure to ensure that Johnson Con-
trols fulfills its potential of augmenting women's rights in the work-
place,3 05 one can readily predict that the Exide program will not be
sustained by a reviewing court. Women's rights activists and other polit-
ical figures describe Johnson Controls as among the most significant wo-
men's rights cases in modem history."0 6 In predicting the aftermath of
Johnson Controls, scholars and political leaders estimate that the decision
will have an indelible impact on American business by requiring them to
ensure the health and safety of the workplace for both men and women,
rather than permitting companies to exclude women from an unhealthy
workplace by designating sterility as a job qualification30 7 These groups
305. See Fetal Protection Issues Remain to be Resolved, 139 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 117-
18 (Feb. 3, 1992) (describing the aftermath of Johnson Controls and the depicting business
response); Kary L. Moss, A Victory for Choice, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 8,1991, at 13. The writer,
an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, described
Johnson Controls as "[a] resounding victory for women's and workers' rights .... [It
means the an employer must clean up the workplace rather than exclude those groups it
deems most vulnerable to its hazardous environment." Id.; see American Jewish Congress
Pleased with Supreme Court Ruling on Employer's Fetal Protection Policy, PR Newswire,
Mar. 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire File ("We are delighted
with this decision. By unanimous vote, the Supreme Court has made clear that there is no
excuse for discrimination against women in the workplace... ."); Joan E. Bertin & Eliza-
beth A. Werby, No Worker Should Face Unacceptable Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1991,
at A24 (letter to the editor); Ronald E. Roel, Family Issues on '91 Agenda Congress is
Feeling the Heat Over Warm and Fuzzy Policies, TrE ATLAwA J., Jan. 2, 1991, at D1. The
author describes Johnson Controls as "an important sex discrimination case that ultimately
could affect millions of women." Id.; see also Robert P. Hey, Fetal Protection Case Blurs
Traditional Ideological Lines, CHRsMAN Sci. MorroR, Oct. 9, 1990, at 7; Eric Neisser,
Sterility and Toxic Risk Are Not Fair Job Specs, N.J. LAW J., Oct. 25, 1990, at 15, 24
(describing the Johnson Controls policy as "virulently anti-woman and anti-worker").
306. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, A Policy for Her Own Good, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 22, 1990, at 1
("[T]he case 'is likely the most important sex discrimination case in any court' since the
enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.") (quoting Judge Easterbrook of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit)); Bruce Fein & William B. Reyn-
olds, Fetal Protection or Female Rejection, LEGAL TiMms, Oct. 1, 1990, at 24 (describing
Johnson Controls as among "the most potent business cases" of the term); John P. Furfaro
& Maury B. Josephson, Supreme Court Review: Part II, N.Y. LAW J. Oct. 4, 1991, at 3
(characterizing Johnson Controls as "[o]ne of the most publicized cases of the term");
David G. Savage, Court Rejects Limiting Jobs to Protect Fetuses, L.A. TiKEs, Mar. 21, 1991
(describing Johnson Controls as "a decision hailed by feminists").
307. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 305, at 13-14 (explaining that the decision should have
the positive impact of causing employers to make the workplace a healthier and safer place
for all employees). To substantiate her prediction, Moss quoted from the Johnson Controls
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decision stating that "[sex discrimination . . . cannot be used] 'as a method of diverting
attention from an employer's obligation to police the workplace."' Id. at 14 (quoting In-
ternational Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209 (1991) (alterations to
correct misquote in original)). Ms. Moss went on to explain that "[e]mployers must take
into account that some of their workers will be pregnant. They cannot avoid the conse-
quences of their own negligent conduct by eliminating a class of workers from their em-
ployment." Id.; see also Gloria Negri & Diane Lewis, Justices Bar Job Curbs Aimed at
Shielding Fetuses; "Fighting Mad" Worker Celebrates Her Victory at a Vermont Factory,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1991, at 1, 26 (describing the "'landmark sex discrimination
case"' as sending "'a strong message to employers throughout the nation... to provide a
safe workplace for all workers, men and women."' (quoting Peggy Wiesenberg, spokeswo-
man for the Coalition Against Workplace Reproductive Hazards located in Boston)); Sav-
age, supra, note 306, at 1 (reporting that "'[tihe solution to hazardous workplaces is to
eliminate the hazard, not the women employees."' (quoting Marcia Greenberger of the
National Women's Law Center.)).
However, some business leaders criticize Johnson Controls for requiring them to bear
excessive costs to make the workplace hospitable for fertile women. See, e.g., Fetal Protec-
tion Ruling Criticized by Business Community, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at A-11
(Mar. 22, 1991) (explaining that Johnson Controls is "has been met with dismay from a
business community fearing lawsuits and predicting job losses from overseas flight."); see
also Joan Beck, Johnson Controls Decision Leaves Risk for Babies, Bosses, CHI, TM.,
Mar. 25, 1991, at 15 (asserting that "[w]hile the Supreme Court did safeguard the rights of
women in this case, it left two other groups-babies and employers-at serious risk.");
Julia Lawlor, "Victory" For Women is "Cold Comfort" for Business Community, USA To-
DAY, Mar. 21, 1991, at 2A (reporting that "[w]hile feminists applaud Wednesday's Supreme
Court decision abolishing corporate fetal protection policies, the business community
warns the ruling could make life on the job even more difficult"). Julia Lawlor reported
that rather than hire fertile women and endure the extra costs of ensuring the health and
safety of the workplace, "'[t]here's speculation here that it will drive companies to do more
business overseas, or force companies to have robots doing these kinds of jobs."' Id.
(quoting Robin Conrad, Vice-President, United States Chamber of Commerce's National
Chamber Litigation Center); see Peter T. Kilborn, Employers Left With Many Decisions,
N.Y. TiiFms, Mar. 21, 1991, at B12 (reporting that Johnson Controls requires employers to
rescind their exclusionary fetal protection policies adopted "in part to protect themselves
from costly suits" and to decide how to revamp the workplace to ensure the safety and
health of all workers); see also Yxta Maya Murray, Note, Employer Liability After Johnson
Controls: A No-Fault Solution, 45 STAN. L. REv. 453 (1993) (arguing that the issue of
whether the doctrine of preemption will protect businesses that adhere to Johnson Con-
trols from negligence suits brought under state law remains unresolved). The Note main-
tains that Johnson Controls "leaves employers at risk. Business that follow the Court's
ruling may expose fertile female employees to toxic substances, yet there is no guarantee
that compliance with Title VII will shield employers from tort actions brought on behalf of
employees' injured fetuses." Id
Cf Current Policy Guidance, supra note 294, at 6942 n.7 (examining the Johnson Con-
trols Court's discussion of the potential tort liability issue in which the Court concludes
that employer liability "'seems remote at best."' Id. (quoting International Union, UAW
v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1208 (1991)). If companies comply fully with the
OSHA standards regulating lead exposure, inform women workers of the potential
hazards, and maintain working environments free of negligent conditions, then such em-
ployers should not be deemed liable for any resulting fetal injury. Johnson Controls, 111 S.
Ct. at 1208). Johnson Controls mandates that women may not be refused positions in the
lead industry based on their fertility; this requirement does not alter an employer's duties
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predict that Johnson Controls will have the far-reaching impact of prohib-
iting employers from banning women from any position for which they
are qualified.3 °0 The widespread impact of Johnson Controls can be
evinced by the fact that a number of companies have rescinded their for-
mer fetal protection policies that violated Johnson Controls,309 and courts
throughout the country have relied on the decision as a basis for invali-
dating other employer policies. 10 Undeniably, the Johnson Controls pre-
cedent should be employed to invalidate more neutral measures,
under common law negligence principles to maintain a safe and healthy workplace. See id.;
see also Bertin Interview, supra note 256.
308. See Ethan Bronner, Justices Bar Job Curbs Aimed at Shielding Fetuses; Restrictions
on Women are Held to be Biased, BosToN GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1991, at 1. The article predicts
that Johnson Controls "will probably force companies to work harder to reduce the levels
of substances that could endanger fetuses... Until now, a common way of dealing with the
problem has been to bar women from the jobs to avoid harm...." Id. at 28; see also
supra note 305.
309. See Employers Rescind Fetal Protection Policies Following Johnson Controls, But
Fear Liability, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 62, at A-2 (Apr. 1, 1991) (reporting that
"[c]hemical companies quickly began rescinding fetal protection policies in reaction to the
U.S. Supreme Court's March 20 ruling that companies may not bar women from jobs that
could be hazardous to fetuses"); Fetal Protection Issues Remain to be Resolved, 139 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 117-18 (Feb. 3, 1992) (discussing companies' former fetal protection
policies).
310. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 791-92 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (relying on Johnson Controls to support his assertion "that classifi-
cations based on ability to become pregnant are necessarily discriminatory"); Lucero v.
Operation Rescue, 954 F.2d 624, 632 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying Johnson Controls to find
that a purported beneficent intention will not "neutralize a discriminatory motive");
EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 60 (1992); Hernandez v. University of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214, 216 (D.
Minn. 1992) (drawing on Johnson Controls's logic, the court stated that a BFOQ may be
established only if the criterion relates to the "'central mission of the employer's busi-
ness"'); Huisenga v. Opus Corp., 494 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. 1992) (invalidating a policy analo-
gous to that in Johnson Controls that required women to prove their infertility as a
precondition for employment in the lead industry on the ground that no BFOQ for infertil-
ity existed); EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Ass'n, 780 F. Supp. 1195, 1196 (N.D. Iln. 1991) (fol-
lowing Johnson Controls by concluding that collective bargaining agreements that disfavor
pregnant women must be construed as facially discriminatory; hence they may only be
sustained if a BFOQ exists); Little Forest Medical Ctr. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n, 575
N.E.2d 1164, 1169 (Ohio 1991) (applying disparate treatment analysis over disparate im-
pact analysis to gender-discriminatory hiring practices), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 1263 (1992);
O'Loughlin v. Pinchback, 579 So. 2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (analyzing an employer
policy that discriminated on the basis of pregnancy in accord with Johnson Controls princi-
ples); see also Turpin v. Merreil Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir.)
(relying on Johnson Controls to support the proposition that animal studies "often com-
prise the backbone of evidence indicating biological hazards"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84
(1992); EEOC v. J. M. Huber Corp., 942 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring the Fifth
Circuit to reexamine an employer practice of withholding a past employee's retirement
benefits where the former worker contested her termination under Title VII). The Huber
court resolved the issue of whether Johnson Controls mandates that the policy be charac-
terized as facially discriminatory. Id. at 932. In resolving this issue, the court determined
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including the Exide program, that attempt to circumvent the decision by
replacing overt exclusionary policies with more cryptic devices designed
to accomplish the identical, unlawful goal of discrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc. marks a major victory for working women. Johnson Con-
trols dictates that an employer may not attempt to shape the direction of
its female employees' vocational choices, except in very limited circum-
stances. Johnson Controls established a uniform rule of law that fetal
protection policies amount to facial discrimination, and therefore directly
violate Title VII, as amended by the PDA.3 ' Thus, the decision repudi-
ated the use of the modified business necessity test for fetal protection
policies previously utilized by the Fourth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
to sustain such employer measures. This important pronouncement re-
writes the law in the employment discrimination field by mandating that
fetal protection policies be analyzed according to disparate treatment
principles. The Johnson Controls decision positively impacts millions of
working women who will no longer be excluded on the basis of their fer-
tility from jobs for which they are qualified.
The critical question of the scope of Johnson Controls endures. Inter-
national Union, UAW v. Exide Corp. requires the resolution of whether
mandatory employer programs that entice women to refuse certain jobs
on the basis of their fertility can survive judicial review in the aftermath
of Johnson Controls. Clearly, the rationale of Johnson Controls can be
applied to invalidate such measures. Johnson Controls expressly prohib-
its employers from directly accomplishing this impermissible objective by
instituting explicit exclusionary policies. Therefore, the Exide program,
which utilizes less obvious means to achieve the identical discriminatory
goal, will not be sustained. If such a policy survived judicial scrutiny, the
application and impact of Johnson Controls would be severely under-
mined.
Sheryl Rosensky Miller
that Johnson Controls does not require that employer policies that exclude persons on
criteria other than gender be classified automatically as facially discriminatory. Id
311. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1207 (1991).
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